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TORTS
R. T. BARD* AND CAREY A. RANDALL" *
INTRODUCTION
This Survey is written to help lawyers find cases in point. The emphasis
is on facts rather than on theory. Where doubt arose as to whether a case
should be included the decision has been in favor of inclusion, although
the subject might well include areas other than the law of torts. The
material covered is found in twenty-one volumes of the Southern Reporter
and twenty-five volumes of the Federal Reporter.1 Even a specialist in tort
law could experience difficulty in keeping abreast of this volume of cases.
The material covered is outlined as follows: 2
I. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
B. The Guest Statute
C. Care Required of Motorists
1. INTERSECTION ACCIDENTS
2. REAR-END COLLISIONS
3. PEDESTRIANS
4. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
5. OTHER NEGLIGENT OPERATION
6. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
II. STATUTORY LIABILITY
A. Statutes Affecting the Right to Maintain an Action
B. Jones and Federal Employers' Liability Acts
C. Railroad Operation
D. Federal Tort Claims Act
III. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
A. Landlord and Tenant
B. Common Carriers
C. Distribution of Electricity
D. Doctor - Patient
* Associate Editor of the University of Miami Law Review (Vol. XVII).
** Editor-in-Chief of the University of Miami Law Review (Vol. XVII).
1. August 1959 through August 1961.
2. The authors in the main have followed the outline and imitated the style of
538 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVI
E. Manufacturers and Suppliers
F. Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers
G. Care Owed Invitees
1. INJURIES NOT INVOLVING FALLS
2. SLIP, TRIP AND FALL
H. Master -Servant
I. Warranty
J. Defenses in Common Law Cases
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
2. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
3. IMMUNITY
K. Res Ipsa Loquitur
L. Damages
IV. OTHER COMMON LAW TORTS
A. Libel and Slander
B. Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest
V. LEGISLATION
I. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
Florida's adaptation of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to auto-
mobile law imposes liability upon an automobile owner for injuries to third
persons resulting from the negligence of anyone operating the automobile
with the owner's authorization. Liability has been extended in the past to
one who had possession and dominion and control over the vehicle;3 while
recovery has been denied from a holder of the registered title who sold
the automobile before the accident. 4 During this survey period the majority
of cases under the doctrine have been concerned with who is an "owner."
In Cox Motor Co. v. Faber5 a purchaser executed a preliminary contract,
made a down payment and took possession of a car from a dealer. A month
later, after having paid one installment, the purchaser negligently injured
the plaintiff. In an action against the dealer, the plaintiff relied upon a
Daniels, Torts, Fourth Survey of Fla. Law, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 602 (1960). In the
preparation of the article we have had the helpful comments of Mr. Sam Powers, Member
of the Florida Bar and Mr. Thomas A. Wills, Professor of Law, University of Miami.
3. Re-Mark Chem. Co. v. Ross, 101 So.2d 163 (Fla. App. 1958).
4. McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1957).
5. 113 So.2d 771 (Fla. App. 1959). Followed in Hicks v. Land, 117 So.2d 11
(Fla. App.), cert. denied, 120 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1960).
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clause in the contract to purchase which stated that the purchaser acquired
no right, title or interest in the property until the property was delivered
to him and either the full purchase price was paid or a satisfactory deferred
payment agreement was executed. The trial court found that ownership
remained in the dealer in the absence of any showing that the purchase
price had been paid or a deferred payment plan executed. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the effect of the clause was only to reserve
legal title in the dealer. Beneficial interest lay in the purchaser, who was
the owner in respect to tort liability.
A purchaser in another case6 signed a "Used Car Order," under the
terms of which he was permitted to cancel the order at his option. He
tested the car for one day and returned it as unsuitable. The dealer's
salesman persuaded him to test the car for two more days, in which period the
purchaser collided with the plaintiff. A judgment against the dealer was
affirmed, the issue of ownership under the circumstances having been
properly submitted to the jury.
A summary judgment for the defendant was held to have been error
when the evidence showed that the defendant had orally agreed to sell
a car to a friend, and that the friend had used the car for six months without
payment and returned it to the defendant shortly after an accident with
the plaintiff. The question of beneficial ownership was for the jury.7
The opinion in Martin v. Lloyd Motor Co.8 thoroughly reviews Florida
law in regard to bailees and lessees of motor vehicles. An owner delivered
his automobile to a dealer to sell for him with an agreement that prospective
purchasers could test-drive the car. An interested customer negligently
killed the plaintiff's decedent. The complaint against the bailee-dealer was
dismissed on the ground that there was no allegation that the bailment was
made for mutual benefit or profit, that the alleged negligence of the bailee
was gross or that he acted in bad faith. In reversing on appeal, the court
applied the standard of "possession and dominion and control" to hold
that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is applicable to a bailee who
permits a third person to drive the automobile, whether the bailment is
gratuitous, for hire or for mutual benefit. The bailee's liability is not
dependent upon a showing of bad faith or gross negligence.
When an owner of a car becomes liable under the doctrine for the
negligence of an employee of one to whom the owner has bailed the car,
the owner is entitled to indemnity from the bailee-employer.9 A husband,
who was the manager of a corporation, drove his wife's car to work and
6. Fricker v. Lester, 114 So.2d 694 (Fla. App. 1959).
7. Register v. Redding, 126 So.2d 289 (Fla. App. 1961).
8. 119 So.2d 413 (Fla. App. 1960).
9. Hutchins v. Frank E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So.2d 273 (Fla. App. 1960).
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loaned it to an employee, who injured the plaintiff. The cross-claim of the
defendant wife was upheld against the defendant corporation.
The question of authorization by the owner was disputed in Blanford
v. Nourse.10 A highway patrolman arrived at the scene of a minor accident,
decided the defendant was intoxicated, and took the driver's seat of the
defendant's car to drive him to a patrol station. The plaintiff was injured
while the patrolman was at the wheel. No liability attached to the defend-
ant-owner under the doctrine, since there was an absence of consent. The
evidence showed that the owner believed he bad no alternative but to
permit the patrolman to drive.
Hale v. Adams" raised points of first impression under both the dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine and the guest statute.12  The owner was
riding in his car, which was being driven by his daughter. After. a negligent
collision, the owner's complaint in a suit for personal injury brought against
his daughter was dismissed on the ground that the negligence of the operator
was imputed to the owner. The case was reversed on appeal and the rule
announced that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine has no application
in an action by the owner against the negligent operator. The doctrine
finds its basis in respondeat superior with a principal-agent relationship
existing between the owner and the operator. Negligence of an agent cannot
be imputed to a principal in an action by the principal against the agent.
Shattuck v. Mullen,13 involving a collision between two aircraft, appears
to have extended the doctrine to impose liability upon the owner of a private
airplane for the negligence of the operator. Suit was brought by one pilot
against the pilot of the second plane and its owner. Although the single
issue raised on appeal by both defendants was the applicability of a jury
charge on last clear chance, 14 the court considered an airplane to be as
much a dangerous instrumentality as an automobile for the purpose of
applying the doctrine of. last clear chance.
B. The Guest Statute
The majority of cases involving Florida's guest statute15 have turned
on the question of whether the defendant's conduct has constituted gross
negligence. The guidelines furnished by the supreme court in Carraway v.
Revell'0 successfully eliminated much previous uncertainty in defining the
degree of negligence required under the statute. Consequently, recent deci-
10. 120 So.2d 830 (Fla. App. 1960).
11. 117 So.2d 524 (Fla.App. 1960).
12. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1961). See text accompanying note 29 infra.
13. 115 So.2d 597 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 119 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1960), 15
U. MIAMi L. REV. 214 (1960).
14. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
15. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1961).
16. 116 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1959).
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sions have been concerned primarily with the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
evidence to meet the Carraway standards of gross negligence. 17 On retrial
of the Carraway case, a finding of gross negligence was warranted by evidence
showing that an automobile driver knew a tire was worn smooth and
presented more than just a possibility of blow out.18
In Farrey v. Bettendorf,19 when a minor driver of a motor scooter failed
to keep a lookout ahead and his passenger was injured, a jury question was
raised as to whether the .conduct amounted to a conscious indifference to
consequences of a mere momentary lapse.
In six cases recovery was denied when the plaintiff either failed to raise
a, question of material fact as to gross negligence, 20 or failed to state a
cause of action. 21 Three of these cases involved cars running off the road.
In White v. Godwin22 the defendant swerved off the highway to avoid
an oncoming car in the'same lane, and turned over in attempting to re-enter
the highway. The proximate cause of the injury was held to be the defend-
ant's act of attempting to maneuver back on the road, and there was no
evidence that this course of conduct would have caused a reasonable and
prudent man to know that it would most likely result in injury to the
plaintiff.. Similarly, there was no gross negligence when lack of familiarity
with a new power steering system caused the defendant in Godwin v.
Ringley23 to veer into the path of a truck while trying to get back on the
road; A count in gross negligence was held properly dismissed in Wilson
v. Eagle,24 in which the car overturned after striking a soft shoulder.
Although the count contained allegations that the car was traveling sixty to
sixty-five miles per hour on a wet highway, that defendant had previously
run off the road and that the plaintiff had warned the defendant, the court
found the complaint deficient in failing to allege where the defendant had
17. Gross negligence: that degree of negligence which lies in the area between ordinary
negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct; that course of conduct which a reasonable
and prudent man would know would probably and most likely result in injury to persons
or property; that course of conduct such that the likelihood of injury to other persons or
property is known by the actor to be imminent or clear and present. Carraway v. Revell,
116 So.2d 16, 22, 23 (Fla. 1959).
18. Revell v. Carraway, 124 So.2d 874 (Fla. App. 1960).
19. 123 So.2d 558 (Fla. App. 1960). The evidence was held sufficient to go to
the jury in Reynolds v. Aument, 133 So.2d 562 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 135 So.2d 743
(Fla. 1961) (excessive speed coupled with other facts); Douglass v. Calvin, 130 So.2d 282(Fla. App. 1961) (excessive speed coupled with other facts); Mahoney v. La Russo, 120
So.2d 660 (Fla. App. 1960) (no facts stated).
20. Watts v. Smith, 133 So.2d 569 (Fla., App. 1961) (no facts stated); Godwin
v. Ringley, 126 So.2d 163 (Fla. App. 1961); White v. Godwin, 124 So.2d 525 (Fla. App.
1960); Messina v. Zuber, 116 So.2d 780 (Fla. App. 1960) (no facts stated); Dye v.
Freeman, 116 So.2d 647 (Fla. App. 1959) (brakes applied as soon as driver realized car
ahead was stopped).
21. Wilson v. Eagle, 120 So.2d 207 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. .124 So.2d 525 (Fla. App. 1960).
23. 126 So.2d 163 (Fla. App. 1961).
24. 120 So.2d 207 (Fla. App. 1960).
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previously run off the highway and in failing to indicate that the defendant
was aware of the danger of the soft shoulder.
The question of contributory negligence under the statute was presented
in one Fifth Circuit case.25 After a judgment for the plaintiff, a new
trial was granted on the basis of evidence tending to show that the parties
had been drinking together. The court held that it was error to have
removed the defense of contributory negligence from the jury's considera-
tion since, under Florida law, a recovery may not be had under the guest
statute by a passenger who voluntarily rides with one who is not a safe
driver by reason of having imbibed too much.
The guest statute has been held not to apply to a passenger who is
transported solely for the benefit of the owner or operator, or for the
mutual benefit of the passenger and the owner or operator.26 In determining
the question of mutual benefit when one businessman drove another to a
restaurant during an intermission in a conference, the court held that the
passenger was a guest within the statute.2 7  Neither the fact that business
was resumed after dinner nor the fact that "shop talk" took place during
dinner changed the social nature of the trip. However, mutual benefit
existed when the operator of a car transported the plaintiff to obtain a loan
in connection with a business matter in which both parties had an interest.2 8
The Hale v. Adams 29 litigation reappeared in the appellate court after
the owner-passenger failed to establish a prima facie showing of gross negli-
gence and was denied permission to amend his allegation to ordinary
negligence. The majority of the court, in reversing, considered their earlier
opinion to have held collaterally that the owner-passenger could recover
under proof of ordinary negligence. In a special concurrence 30 Chief Judge
Carroll was unable to reach this conclusion, which he believed would oppose
the principle of the guest statute by permitting an owner, who happened
to be a passenger, to recover against a driver for simple negligence, while
other passengers in the same car would be required to prove gross negligence
or wilful and wanton misconduct. He reasoned that the question of gross
negligence should have gone to the jury under instructions concerning the
plaintiff's status as a guest or passenger under the statute.
25. Mascarenas v. Johnson, 280 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1960).
26. Sullivan v. Stock, 98 So.2d 507 (Fla. App. 1957).
27. Berne v. Peterson, 113 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117 So.2d
843 (Fla. 1960).
28. Tillman v. McLeod, 124 So.2d 135 (Fla. App. 1960).
29. 138 So.2d 761 (Fla. App. 1962) (action by owner-passenger against his daughter.
driver). For earlier history see Hale v. Adams, 117 So.2d 524 (Fla. App. 1960) and text
accompanying note 11 supra.
30. 138 So.2d at 763.
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C. Care Required of Motorists
1. INTERSECTION ACCIDENTS
More often than not in an intersection collision, some lack of due
care can be attributed to both parties. Contributory negligence by the
plaintiff was responsible for a top-heavy number of trial court judgments
favoring the defendant (fifteen out of seventeen). Eleven defendant judg-
ments were affirmed. 3l Grounds for the four reversals were failure to allow
questions to go to the jury,32 error in applying the principles of law applic-
able to contributory negligence 33 and omitting to charge on the duty of a
driver to obey a stop sign.34
The plaintiff in Riles v. Hege35 was proceeding at thirty miles per hour
on a main thoroughfare and struck the defendant crossing from the right
on an unmarked side street. The defendant, who was moving at five to
ten miles per hour, testified that a late afternoon sun was directly in his
eyes. The affirmance of a directed verdict for the defendant produced a
strong dissent based upon the contention that the evidence tending to over-
weigh the prima facie case (created by failure to yield to a vehicle on the
right) should have been considered by the jury.3 6
The doctrine of sudden emergency was reviewed thoroughly in Hormo-
vitis v. Mut. Lumber Co. 37 When the brakes of plaintiff's truck failed
31. Riles v. Hege, 133 So.2d 84 (Fla. App. 1961), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 334
(Fla. 1962) (directed verdict based on contributory negligence); Sahlsten v. Leach, 133
So.2d 83 (Fla. App. 1961) (jury verdict on question of which car entered unmarked
intersection first); Garrison v. Hertz Corp., 129 So.2d 452 (Fla. App. 1961) (jury verdict
when defendant stopped, then proceeded and was hit by plaintiff); Raven v. Coates, 125
So.2d 770 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1961) (complaint against city
for failure to maintain stop sign dismissed); Hormovitis v. Mut. Lumber Co., 120 So.2d
42 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 123 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1960) (summary judgment when
plaintiff's truck ran through stop street as brakes.failed); Lunsford v. Laite, 116 So.2d 797
Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 120 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1960) (jury verdict, no facts stated);
osens v. Weaver, 115 So.2d 455 (Fla. App. 1959) (jury verdict when cars approached
at right angles and defendant turned in same direction that plaintiff was proceeding);
Driscoll v. Morris, 114 So.2d 314 (Fla. App. 1959) (jury verdict on conflicting testimony
as to whether defendant stopped at controlled intersection); Kramer v. Landau, 113 So.2d
756 (Fla. App. 1959) (summary judgment on evidence that plaintiff's driver ran stop
sign); McWhorter v. Curby, 113 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1959) (no cause of action in
allegation that railroad was negligent in obstructing drivers' view with standing freight car);
Kniskern v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 113 So.2d 563 (Fla. App. 1959) (directed
verdict when plaintiff proceeded through green light despite defendant's truck blocking
intersection).
32. Verducci v. Plasse, 121 So.2d 37 (Fla. App. 1960) (trial court considered plain-
tiff's testimony incredible); Mele v. Summers, 113 So.2d 254 (Fla. App. 1959) (plaintiff
thought he had time to cross ahead of defendant).
33. Barr v. Mizrahi, 124 So.2d 508 (Fla. App. 1960) (plaintiff not contributorily
negligent as matter of law when he looked but failed to see defendant).
34. Allen v. Rucks, 121 So.2d 167 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 877 (Fla.
1960) (trial judge failed to instruct jury regarding duty of defendant to obey a stop sign).
35. 133 So.2d 84 (Fla. App. 1961), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1962).
36. Id. at 87.
37. 120 So.2d 42 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 123 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1960).
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at a stop street and the driver ran up on the center island of the crossing
highway, the defendant was held to have acted reasonably in an emergency,
even though he swerved into the plaintiff's truck in an effort to avoid it.
The City of Hialeah was joined as a defendant in Raven v. Coates3
on a theory of negligence in failing to replace a stop sign.. In affirming
a dismissal of the complaint, 9 the court doubted that any casual relation
could be shown between the damages and the absence of the sign, even
if the city were otherwise liable, since a person using a street is under a
duty to exercise his faculties to discover and avoid dangers.
Of the two affirmed plaintiffs' judgments, Kuhn v. Telford40 illustrates
the nice distinctions which must be drawn frequently in collision cases.
Testimony indicated that the plaintiff was traveling between twenty and
thirty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone, and conflicted
as to whether or not the defendant. stopped at the crossing stop street. On
appeal from a second trial, a directed verdict for the plaintiff was reversed
unanimously on the ground of contributory negligence. The trial court was
affirmed on rehearing4' with the rationale that, from the fact that the
plaintiff was struck in the side and toward the rear, any slight speeding by
the plaintiff could not have proximately contributed to the accident.
2. REAR-END COLLISIONS
Appellate reversals in six out of eight rear-end collision cases indicate
that a particularly fine line often exists between evidence requiring a directed
verdict for the litigant associated with the leading car and evidence entitling
his adversary to reach the jury.
The commonplace rear-end collision involves the plaintiff stopped at
a traffic signal as the defendant strikes the rear of the plaintiff's car. The
obligation imposed upon a motor vehicle operator to maintain control of his
vehicle at all times, commensurate with the circumstances, has resulted in
the rule re-enunciated in Bellere v. Madsen:42
[W]here a defendant runs into the rear of plaintiff's car while
plaintiff is stopped for a traffic light or at an intersection, there
is a presumption of negligence of the defendant on which the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the absence of an expla-
nation by the defendant.
The Belleredefendant had been moving in a chain of cars approaching
a red light and testified that his attention was diverted temporarily by
38. 125 So.2d 770 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1961).
39. See text accompanying note 231 infra.
40. 115 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117.So.2d 843 (Fla. 1960).
41. Id. at 39.
42. 114 So.2d 619, 621 (Fla. 1959).
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concern for the proximity of a pedestrian on the roadside. A judgment
for the defendant was reversed when the court held that he was not
entitled to a charge on the theory of "sudden emergency" under circum-
stances in which his own negligence contributed to the creation of the
emergency.
Two other typical cases also resulted in- reversals. The driver's explana-
tion in Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton43 'that his brakes failed was held
sufficient to raise a question for the jury as. to whether he had overcome the
presumption of negligence against him. But testimony.in Kimenker v.
Greater Miami Car Rental, Inc.44 that the driver had to swerve to avoid
a bus pulling out from the curb did not overcome the presumption, and the
plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict.
Jury questions were presented under three factual situations in which
the leading vehicles were stopped for reasons other than a traffic signal.
judgments on verdicts were affirmed in two of these cases, one in favor
of the plaintiff,4" the other in favor of the defendant. 46  In the third case
a summary judgment for the defendant was reversed when conflicting testi-
mony raised questions which should have been determined by a jury. 47
The plaintiff in Cook v. Mason4 s was partially blinded by the headlights
of an approaching car. The defendant relied upon the range of vision rule,49
which imposes a duty upon a driver blinded by oncoming lights to use
reasonable care, even to the extent of stopping, to avoid injury to anyone
who might be ahead of him. The rule was held not to establish negligence
as a matter of law in the event of accident, but merely to set forth the duty
of the driver to be considered under the circumstances by the jury.
Summary judgments for defendants suffered reversals in the two litiga-
tions evolving from rear-end collisions when both vehicles were in motion.
The plaintiff motorcycle driver's evidence raised a question of fact in
Rianhard v. Rice;50 and the existence of a sudden emergency in Gertler v.
Peterson,51 rebutting the presumption of negligence against a following
driver, was a matter for jury determination.
43. 119 So.2d 296, (Fla. App. 1960).
44. 115 So.2d 191 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 119 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1960).
45. Cook v. Mason, 133 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1961), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 332(Fla. 1962) (although trailer was off the highway, rear wheels extended three feet into
road and were struck by plaintiff). 
.
46. Staicer v. Hall, 130 So.2d 113 (Fla. App. 1961) (plaintiff started in response to
traffic officer's signal, then stopped when light turned red).
47. Dubov v. Ropes, 124 So.2d 34 (Fla. App. 1960) (defendant stopped station
wagon in highway to retrieve twelve-foot pole which had fallen out).
48. 133 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1961).
49. Mathers v. Botsford, 86 Fla. 40, 42, 97 So. 282 (1923).50. 119 So.2d 730 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 123 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1960) (motorcycle
struck by passing truck).
51. 116 S0.2d 778 (Fla. App. 1960) (defendant shifted lanes, crossing ahead of
plaintiff).
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3. PEDESTRIANS
Notwithstanding the high degree of care which must be exercised by
a motorist in any area where children may be anticipated, a child has a
reciprocal duty, commensurate with his age, intelligence and experience,
to look for traffic before entering a roadway. When a child rushes into
the side of a passing vehicle, the evidence usually warrants a decision for
the defendant without the need for a determination of facts by the jury.
In two cases of this nature, a directed verdict 5 2 and a summary judgment 8
were both affirmed.
Even when the child enters the path of the vehicle, contributory negli-
gence may be found as a matter of law. In Riedel v. Driscoll54 a girl of
fourteen, after leaving a bus, stepped in front of an approaching automobile
on a heavily traveled street. The driver was exceeding the twenty-five
mile per hour speed limit by five to eight miles per hour, and her brakes
were partially defective. A judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff
was reversed for a new trial, 5 the court finding that contributory negligence
had been established by the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
However, in a case"8 involving a child struck in a marked cross walk,
a judgment on a verdict for the defendant was reversed for error in an
instruction which, in effect, made the plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence if she failed to determine that her path was safe before entering the
street. Although a county ordinance which provided a right of way to a
pedestrian in a cross walk did not confer an absolute right of way, it
combined with plaintiff's testimony to furnish evidence from which the
jury could have drawn conclusions of fact sufficient to have established the
plaintiff's case.
One pedestrian case57 centered around the thirty mile per hour speed
limit58 in a residence district.59 A thirteen year old boy was struck near
the entrance of a trailer park by a car traveling forty-five to fifty miles
per hour. The trailer park contained two houses and twenty-one occupied
52. Jackson v. Haney, 124 So.2d 719 (Fla. App. 1960).
53. Griffis v. Du Bow, 114 So.2d 207 (Fla. App. 1959). Followed in Bailey v.
Keene, 122 So.2d 498 (Fla. App. 1960), in which a defendant's summary judgment was
affirmed, although the facts do not indicate the manner of contact between the plaintiff
and the automobile.
54. 124 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1960).
55. On retrial defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied. Petition for
certiorari was dismissed in Riedel v. Driscoll, 127 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1961).
56. Zadan v. Cohen, 127 So.2d 466 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 133 So.2d 322
(Fla. 1961).
57. Vissers v. Jordan, 131 So.2d 754 (Fla. App. 1961).
58. FLA. STAT. § 317.22 (1961).
59. FLA. STAT. § 317.01(19) (1961): "RESIDENCE DISTRICT. The territory
contiguous to, and including, a highway not comprising a business district when the
property on such highway, for a distance of three hundred feet or more, is in the main
improved with residence or residences and buildings in use for business."
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trailers, and covered a road frontage of 330 feet. The trial court refused
to permit the jury to determine whether the area was a residence district
within the statute. In reversing a judgment for the defendant, the appellate
court noted the rule announced in Gordon v. Cozart ° that if the evidence
is conflicting as to the number and extent of the residences the question
is for the jury, and proceeded to hold: "When, as here, the number and
location of the residences is not ir dispute but reasonable men may differ
as to whether the inferences warrant the conclusion that the district is 'in
the main' residential, the question is also for the jury."' '
Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth6' brought into issue the concept
of privileged information in an accident report.63 The defendant gave
information to a special police investigator subsequent to having given
information to another officer at the time of the accident for the purpose
of preparing an accident report. The trial court permitted the information
given to the second investigator to be introduced into evidence. Judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed with the holding that the subsequent information
was privileged equally with the statements provided for the official accident
report. For a statement to be privileged as an accident report, it is not
necessary that it be given to the investigating officer, be given at the scene
of accident, or be used in a subsequently filed report of the accident. 64
With the exception of Manganelli v. Covington5  and Blanford v.
Nourse,66 the remaining pedestrian cases involved the doctrine of last clear
chance, and are discussed in the succeeding subsection.
4. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Possibly no facet of automobile law lends itself to more uncertainty
than the doctrine of last clear chance. As stated by Mr. Justice Thomal in
the James v. Keene67 opinion, "the rule itself is not so complicated as is the
variety of factual situations which have produced the necessity for considering
the applicability of the rule to particular cases."
60. 110 So.2d 75 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 114 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1959).
61. 131 So.2d at 755.
62. 129 So.2d 704 (Fla. App. 1961).
63. FLA. STAT. § 317.17 (1961).
64. Based upon FLA. STAT. § 317.13(2) (1961): "The department may require
any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, of which report must be made as provided
in this section, to' file supplemental reports, whenever the original report is insufficient in
the opinion of the department, and may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to
the department."
65. 114"So.2d 320 (Fla. App. 1959). An involuntary nonsuit was affirmed. The
evidence could not support a finding of negligence when the plaintiff was struck first by
another car and thrown into the path of the defendant's vehicle.
66. 120 So.2d 830 (Fla. App. 1960). An involuntary nonsuit was affirmed. No
negligence was shown when the defendant driver was not aware of a mechanical defect
which caused a car to move in reverse when the gear shift was placed in the forward drive
position. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
67. 133 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1961), quashing 121 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 1960).
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.From the same opinion the elements which, under Florida law, must
be present to invoke the doctrine are: (1) that the injured party has already
come into a position of peril; (2) that the injuring party then or thereafter
becomes, or in the exercise of ordinary prudence ought to have become,
aware not only of that fact, but also that the party in peril either reasonably
cannot escape from it, or apparently will not' avail himself of opportunities
open to him for doing so; (3) that the injuring party subsequently has the
opportunity by the exercise of reasonable care to save the other from harm;
and (4) that he fails to exercise such care.
The purpose of the doctrine is to protect a plaintiff from an unjust
application of the rule of contributory negligence. A corollary has prevailed
in some opinions to the effect that the doctrine is not applicable if the
plaintiff's negligence continues up to the time of the injury.6 8 Strict adher-
ence to this concept would appear to bar recovery by any imperiled plaintiff
who remains inattentive to his own safety, a result not borne out by the cases.
A pedestrian in the James case was struck while crossing a four-lane
boulevard at 8:00 p.m. She did not see the defendant's car prior to the
impact. Although visibility -was good and the defendant was driving well
within the speed limit, she failed to observe the plaintiff until it was too
late to avoid striking her. A witness, who had been driving parallel to the
defendant in the adjacent lane, testified that the plaintiff had been visible
for several hundred feet. He had remarked to his wife that there was a lady
who was going to get hit. The district court of appeal held that a charge
on last clear chance had been properly denied. The plaintiff's own con-
tributory negligence had continued until the time of the injurious act; and,
when both plaintiff and defendant were inattentive, neither had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident: In quashing this decision the supreme court
held only that the factual situation presented a question for the jury pursuant
to an appropriate instruction by the trial judge. The tenor of the opinion
disapproved of the lower court's conclusion that an impasse had been reached
through the mutual inattentiveness of the parties, precluding an instruction
on last clear chance. In view of the lower court's finding that the plaintiff
had been visible for several hundred feet, facts sufficient to satisfy each of
the elements of the doctrine could reasonably have been determined.
68. E.g., Falnes v. Kaplan, 101 So.2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1958): "Falnes had not been
put in any position of danger from which he could not extricate himself and his negligence
had not ceased. To terminate his own negligence he had but to step aside when he
became aware of the approaching vehicle ...... Edwards v. Donaldson, 103 So.2d 256,
259 (Fla. App. 1958): "In applying the doctrine of last clear chance to a set of facts we
much concern ourselves initially with the premise that in order to invoke such a doctrine it
is necessary that there must be competent substantial evidence clearly indicating that the
prior negligence-of the plaintiff in placing himself in a perilous position had terminated or
culminated and from which the exercise of ordinary care on his part would not thereafter
extricate him."
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. Douglas v. Hackney,6 decided the same day as James, went the other
way. A pedestrian was struck and killed in the act of crossing a busy thor-
oughfare at night.' The defendant testified that he did not see the deceased
prior to impact. There were no witnesses and no evidence of negligence on
the part of the defendant.' The supreme court found no basis for a charge
.on last clear chance when there was no factual support for a jury inference
that the driver saw, or reasonably should have seen, the deceased in sufficient
time to avoid striking him.
Trial courts erred in three remaining cases involving pedestrians by
excluding expert'testimony as to the time required for the plaintiff to cross
the defendant's range of vision when the question before the jury was
whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to avoid striking the
plaintiff;70 by denying an instruction on the doctrine when' the defendant
had seen the plaintiff at a distance of sixty to seventy feet before impact;71
and by failing to submit the case to the jury under a charge of last clear
.chance when the defendant's car created skid marks for seventy feet.72
The applicability of the doctrine was' brought 'into question, in an auto-
mobile-bus collision 73 and in litigation resulting from a driver's swerving
off the road to avoid a car turning in his immediate path.74 In Holdsworth
v. Crews75 the plaintiff and defendant were approaching each other from
opposite directions on a two-lane road. The plaintiff's speed Was seventy-five
to eighty-five miles per hour; the defendant was moving slowly in preparation
for a left turn. The defendant testified that he saw the plaintiff's car and
did not think that he had time to turn in front, of it. Nevertheless, he
commenced his turn, crossing partially into the plaintiff's lane. The plaintiff,
swerving off the road to avoid the defendant, struck a tree. The trial court
granted the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of failure to
instruct the jury on last clear chance. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
With the exception of one California case,76. Shattuck v. Mullen77
appears to be 'the only instance of the application of the last clear chance
doctrine to aircraft. *Two light planes collided just above the ground. The
plaintiff was descending to land on a runway crossing the one from which the
defendant was taking.off. Neither party saw the other until the instant
69. 133 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1961), discharging cert. in 121 So.2d 804 (Fla. App. 1960).
70. Mathews 'v. Carlson, 130 So.2d 625 (Fla. App. 1961).
.71. Hodell v. Snyder, 122 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1960).
72. Huff v. Belcastro, 127 So.2d 476 (Fla. App. 1961).
73. King v. Jacksonville Coach Co., 122 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1960) (charge prop-
erly given; no facts of the collision stated).
74. Holdsworth v. Crews, 129 So.2d 153 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 135 So.2d 743
(Fla. 1961).
75. Ibid.
76. Ebrite v. Crawford, 5 P.2d 686 (Cal. App. 1931), aff'd, 215 Cal. 724, 12
P.2d 937 (1932).
77. 115 So.2d 597 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 119 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1960).
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before the collision. Judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff was reversed
for error in charging on last clear chance when the evidence showed that the
plaintiff and the defendant had equal opportunities to discover each other,
and the defendant took evasive action as soon, as she saw the other plane.
However, the doctrine was found to be applicable to aircraft, in a proper
case, in the same manner in which it has been applied to automobile
operation.
5. OTHER NEGLICENT OPERATION
Among a small number of miscellaneous type accidents giving rise to
appellate opinions, there were three head-on collisions. While no significant
tort law was developed, summary judgments in favor of the defendants
were reversed in all three cases, each turning on an interesting question of
admissible evidence.
In Day v. Stickle78 the plaintiff attempted to testify concerning his
observations of the movements of the other car as it had approached on
the highway. The evidence was rejected by the trial court on the ground
that because the other driver had been killed, the proffered testimony was
barred under the dead man's statute.79  This ruling proved to be reversible
error. The plaintiff's observations of the other car did not constitute a
"transaction" between the plaintiff and the deceased operator within the
meaning of the statute.
Reversed also was a directed verdict for a defendant in a traffic lane who
struck the rear of the plaintiff's car after it had backed partially from a diag-
onal parking space.80 The evidence was sufficient to require that it be
submitted to a jury. A reversal on certiorari in favor of the plaintiff, in a
case growing out of a collision between an overtaken truck and an overtaking
truck, was concerned solely with error in refusing evidence.,'
An exceptional action was maintained in Halavin v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc.82 The plaintiff lost control of a car and house trailer, which
turned over, as the alleged result of suction created by the negligent operation
of defendant's tractor-trailer while passing the plaintiff's vehicle at high speed.
There was no physical contact. Admitting an extremely close question, the
court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the
78. 113 So.2d 559 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1959). The two
other head-on collision cases were Sconyer v. Scheper, 119 So.2d 408 (Fla. App.), cert.
denied, 120 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1960) (experts differed on competency of minor witness
severely injured by collision) and Tarkoff v. Schmunk, 117 So.2d 442 (Fla. App. 1959)
(physician's testimony that deceased driver suffered stroke prior to collision was opinion
only)79. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1961).
80. Belden v. Lynch, 126 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1961).
81. Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 135 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1961), quashing 125 So.2d 589 (Fla.
App. 1960).
82. 124 So.2d 746 (Fla. App. 1960).
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evidence was of sufficient competence and substance to justify a lawful
inference by a jury that the negligence of the defendant proximately caused
the plaintiff's injuries.
The owner parked his automobile on a city street and left the ignition
unlocked in violation of city and county ordinances. A third party took the
car without authority and negligently injured the plaintiff. A dismissal of
the complaint against the owner was affirmed88 on the ground that the
defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. In follow-
ing the majority view in this case of first impression in Florida, the court
noted that a wilful, malicious or criminal act, as a general rule, breaks the
chain of causation.
A fortiori, a plaintiff whose husband was killed by a car thief suffered
an adverse judgment on the pleadings in an action against the car owner
when no statute or ordinance prohibited leaving ignition keys in an auto-
mobile.8 4
6. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Contributory negligence, as a major issue in most automobile cases, has
necessarily been mentioned in previous subsections. The following discussion
is confined primarily to those cases which have not been identified earlier.
Two cars, each proceeding at approximately fifteen miles per hour, col-
lided at an intersection. The plaintiff testified that he looked to left and
right but did not see the defendant, who came out of a cross street. A jury
verdict for the plaintiff was set aside by the trial court, and judgment entered
for the defendant, the plaintiff being held guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed85 for misapplication of the
rule of contributory negligence, quoting from Nelson v. Ziegler:86
The correct rule applicable to the defense of contributory neg-
ligence is that only in those cases where negligence of a plaintiff
proximately contributes to the cause of his own injury and damage
will such negligence bar recovery. A plaintiff can be guilty of
some negligence but unless it is negligence that proximately contrib-
uted to causing the injury, then the negligence of the defendant, if
established, remains the proximate cause and despite the fact that
the plaintiff is guilty of some negligence, the defendant can still
be held liable.
A similar result obtained in Alessi v. Farkas,87 when the plaintiff was
83. Lingefelt v. Hanner,.125 So.2d 325 (Fla. App. 1960), 15 U. MIAMI L. REv.
440 (1961).
84. Bryant v. Atlantic Car Rental, Inc., 127 So.2d 910 (Fla. App. 1961).
85. Barr v. Mizrahi, 124 So.2d 508 (Fla. App. 1960).
86. 89 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla. 1956).
87. 118 So.2d 658 (Fla. App. 1960). But see, Owen v. Marvin Indus., Inc., 118
So.2d 673 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 123 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1960) (defendant's summaryjudgment affirmed; plaintiff held guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law).
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driving through a residential district and was struck by the defendant backing
out of a private drive. The court pointed out that contributory' negligence
is normally a jury question. When the jury had the opportunity to weigh
the evidence,.,it was error to set aside the verdict and find the plaintiff guilty
*of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
An automobile passenger was injured and brought action against the
driver of the second car."" The court reversed a directed verdict for the
defendant and reiterated the rule that it is not necessary that the driver
of the car in which the passenger is riding be found free from negligence.
If negligence of the two drivers combines to produce 'and proximately
cause the result, the passenger can recover from the driver and owner
of the second car.
An exception to this rule was illustrated in Smart v. Masker.89  The
injured passenger again brought action against the driver of the second car.
Although both drivers were negligent, the driver of the plaintiff's car had
been drinking and had driven on the wrong side of the road prior to the
accident. These facts were known by the plaintiff. . Judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed. The trial court. was held to have erred in. striking
the defense of contributory negligence; for, when a passenger knows or
should have known that the driver is not exercising that degree of care
compatible with the safety of the passenger, failure to warn, protest or
make a reasonable attempt to leave the ar will constitute contributory
negligence, barring the passenger's' right to recovery.
The driver's tragedy of plunging into a canal and drowning was a
common aspect of two cases. In General Portland Cement Co. v. Walker °
the deceased was backing his truck at night on a lighted company road.
A section of the road caved in, and the truck fell into a canal. There were
no witnesses to the accident. The plaintiff alleged failure to maintain the
road in proper condition' The court affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, noting that although a motorist backing when he cannot
see behind him and there is no one present to guide him is guilty of con-
tributory negligence, the road in this instance was lighted and the deceased
was familiar with the road. Nothing justified a ruling of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. The deceased in City of Hialeah v. Revels9 had
one or two beers and started to drive home. He was found two months
later in a canal. The suit against the city was based upon failure to mark
or barricade the area between the canal and the road. Judgment on a
88. Abrams v. Gresham, 131 So.2d 207 (Fla. App. 1961).
89. 113 So.2d 414 (Fla. App. 1959). Followed in the connected case of Smart v.
Harris, 113 So.2d 418 (Fla. App. 1959).
90. 293 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1961).
91. 123 So.2d 400 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, .129 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1961).
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verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed, the question of contributory negligence
having been properly decided by the jury.
II. STATUTORY LIABILITY
The liability of 'owners of dogs is importantly affected by applicable
Florida statutes. 2 Several cases involving dog owners liability were noted
Under the last Survey, but were noticeable by reason of their absence during
the period of the present Survey. This may indicate either that dogs are
better trained or that people are more careful.
Overconcentration on the common law concepts may lead to failure
to note the existence or the significance of applicable statutes and ordinances.
Statutes may not only affect the substantive law, but also may prevent the
maintenance of an action.
A. Statutes Affecting the Right to Maintain an Action
The Third District Court of Appeal, in response to a certified question,
held that Florida follows the common law rule on the nonassignability of
a personal injury'claim, and, absent statutory authority permitting the waiver
or the assignment of the right to bring an action under the wrongful death
,statute,93 the right of action could not be waived or assigned in favor of a
person in an inferior class by a person occupying a superior position.94 The
same court held that a compensation carrier, required under the Federal
Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act 95 to pay benefits
to a surviving widow, could maintain an action since the federal statute
provided for such an assignment and took precedence over state law.96
Plaintiff and her husband were injured when 'the automobile in which
they were riding struck two black angus cows at night. 97 The husband
subsequently died. The court directed a verdict for the defendants since
the fact that cows were running at large on the highway did not justify
an inference that the owners had violated the Warren Act.9 , Liability under
92. FLA. STAT. §§ 767.01, .04 (1961).
93. FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1961).94. Clar v. Dade County, 116 So.2d 34 (Fla. App. 1959). The question which
the circuit court considered to be without precedent in Florida was: "May the right of
action for wrongful death conferred by the statute (§ 768.02, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.) upon a
minor child of the deceased, be waived or assigned to the Administrator?" Id. at 35.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1958). "Acceptance of such compensation under an
award in a compensation order filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate as an
assignment to the employer' of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover
damages against such third person."96. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Reed Constr. Corp., 132 So.2d 626 (Fla.
App. 1961). The complaint sought damages under FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1961).
97. Gordon v. Sutherland, 131 So.2d 520 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 135 So.2d
742 (Fla. 1961).
98. FLA. STAT. §§ 588.14-.15 (1961).
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the act is limited to an owner who intentionally, wilfully, carelessly or negli-
gently suffers or permits livestock to run at large or stray upon the public
roads.
The decedent was killed in an automobile accident by the negligence
of the defendant. He was survived by his widow and by two minor children
who lived with his ex-wife. The widow brought an action under the
wrongful death act. However, her claim was settled and the action dis-
missed. The widow then attempted to bring an action on behalf of the
minor children. It was held that no action could be maintained by the
children if there was a widow living, even though the children were by a
former marriage and were not compensated for the loss of the father.99
It was held that a father could not maintain an action in tort against
an unemancipated minor child for the death of another minor child.'00
The court, in deciding the case, pointed out that statutory emancipa-
tion' 01 was not alleged and the record was devoid of any showing of a
complete severance of the filial tie.
A wife commenced an action against her husband after their marriage
for personal injuries received before their marriage. The plaintiff wife
argued that the dismissal of her action deprived her of her constitutional
right to sue her husband for the pre-nuptial tort. The court held that the
cause of action was not cancelled or purged by the marriage, but the right
was merely abated or suspended by the marriage.10 2 The wife's only remedy
in this situation would seem to be to divorce her husband.
B. Jones and Federal Employers' Liability Acts
The Jones' 0 3 and Federal Employers' Liability Acts10 4 continued to
produce considerable litigation in the Florida and federal courts. In Gaymon
v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc.,10 5 a seaman disappeared from a fishing
99. Randolph v. Clack, 113 So.2d 270 (Fla. App. 1959).
100. Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So.2d 776 (Fla. App. 1961). Russell v. Meehan,
141 So.2d 332 (Fla. App. 1962) was an action by the administrator of the estate of
the deceased minor. The court concluded that while the nominal plaintiff was the
administrator of the estate of the minor decedent, the decedent's father was the real
party in interest as the decedent's heir at law. The court held that the facts sufficiently
established a defense in the nature of estoppel by judgment, "To hold otherwise would
do violence to the rationale of the rule that a parent or his representative cannot main-
tain an action in tort against an unemancipated minor child, that rationale being 'the neces-
sity for the encouragement of family unity and the maintenance of family discipline.! "
Id. at 333.
101. FLA. STAT. § 62.23 (1961).
102. Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So.2d 805 (Fla. App. 1960). For a different view
as to the right of the wife to sue her husband for an antenuptial tort, see the dissenting
view of Roberts, J. in Amendola v. Amendola, 118 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1960). The
supreme court transferred the appeal to the district court because of lack of jurisdiction.
103. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
104. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
105. 118 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1960).
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boat tied up in port and the drowned body was found two days later. The
boat was not equipped with toilet facilities for the crew and it was customary
for them to relieve themselves over the side of the boat, suspending them-
selves in space outside the boat by holding to its top railing. The court
took judicial notice of the risk involved and reversed a summary judgment
entered for the employer. The court pointed out that a relevant decision
of the United States Supreme Court was not available to the trial court
at the time the judgment was entered. In Connor v. Butler,106 as in Gaymon,
the plaintiff did not know how or why the accident occurred. It now seems
settled law that under the Jones Act and the Federal Employers' Liability
Act it is not necessary to show that the employer's negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury or death complained of, but that it is
sufficient to establish a jury question simply by showing some negligence on
the part of the employer, coupled by direct or circumstantial evidence to the
injury or death of an employee.
Under certain circumstances the fact that a vessel is under-manned may
be found to constitute unseaworthiness or negligence under the Jones Act.
In reversing the lower court the opinion in Fribley v. Bebe, Inc.10 7 pointed
out the very liberal standards established by the United States Supreme
Court l0 8 and recognized by the Florida Supreme Court'0 9 concerning the
minimal quantum of proof necessary to uphold a jury verdict under the
Jones Act and FELA.
There were six FELA cases during the period surveyed. 110 Two pro-
duced holdings that the railroad's liability was a jury question under the
liberal federal rule of liability if employer negligence played any part, even
the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are
sought."' A widow instituted suit under the FELA on behalf of herself
and five children aged ten, twelve, fifteen, sixteen and twenty."12  The
verdict was returned for 150,000 dollars (50,000 for the widow and 20,000
106. 361 U.S. 29 (1959). "The proofs were sufficient to submit to the jury the
question whether employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's injury."
Ibid.
107. 121 So.2d 446 (Fla. App. 1960).
108. Connor v. Butler, 361 U.S. 29 (1959).
109. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Barrett, 101 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1958).
110. Martin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 289 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1961) (damages);
Tate v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 127 So.2d 702 (Fla. App. 1961) (Railroad Retire-
ment Board entitled to reimbursement out of the employee's judgment for benefits
paid him); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ganey, 125 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1960), 15
U. MI AMI L. REV. 420 (1961). In the Ganey case the court held that "absent legisla-
tive authority, where a cause of action accrues to one in the State of Florida, and he
correctly elects the venue of his action in accordance with the appropriate venue statute,
a motion to dismiss or to transfer the action to another court or jurisdiction within this
state, for purposes of trial convenience, is unauthorized .... ." d. at 580.
111. McCloskey v. Louisville & N.R.R., 122 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla. App. 1960);
Butler v. Gay, 118 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla. App.), cert denied, 122 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1960).
112. Butler v. Williams, 133 So.2d 109 (Fla. App. 1961).
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for each child). The court remanded to the circuit court with directions
to enter an appropriate remittitur as to the children or in the alternative'
to grant a new trial on the question of damages. The court pointed out that
Giving the children the most favorable benefit of the jury's com-
pensation to them, by leaving undisturbed the allocation of
$20,000 to the youngest . . . excessiveness became clear when $20,000
was allowed to Wendell who would attain his majority in a little
more than one year.113
The court held that a verdict in an FELA action is susceptible toa remit-
titur order when tried in a state court.
C. Railroad Operation
Railroad crossing accidents were involved in nine cases. In one" 4. a
judgment was reversed because the verdict was clearly contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. In a second trial of the case the plaintiff
announced that she had no additional evidence which would tend to estab-
lish the railroad's liability, and the court entered summary judgment for the
railroad. This'was affirmed on appeal." 5
Discussion of the "presumption statute"" 6 in counsel's opening argu-
ment n 7 and the reading of the statute to the jury as part of the court's
charge 18 were held to be prejudical error. In five of the other seven cases,
liability was held to be a jury question."" In one case it was held that the
railroad was entitled to a directed verdict 20 and in another the application
of the standing train doctrine' 21 in a case in which a motorist crashed into
a moving train resulted in the affirmance of a summary judgment for the
railroad.
113. Id. at 110
114. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Walker, 113 So.2d 420 (Fla. App. 1959).
115. Walker v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 121 So.2d 713 (Fla. App. 1960).
116. FLA. STAT. § 768.05 (1961).
117. Butler v. MacDougal, 120 So.2d 832 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 873
(Fla. 1960).
1.18. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Walker, 113 So.2d 420 (Fla. App. 1959).
119. Tyus v. Apalachicola No. R.R., 130 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1961) (conflict as to
whether signals given); Butler v. Phily, 133 So.2d 337 (Fla. App. 1961) (failure to give
adequate warning of train's approach and to maintain unobstructed view of right of way);
Weeks v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 132 So.2d 315 (Fla. App. 1961) (flagman at crossing
waved red flag although gates and signal 'lights at crossing not in operation); Jones v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 117 So.2d 234 (Fla, App. 1960); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. Hogan, 114 So.2d 29 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1959).
120. O'Keefe v. Butler, 126 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1961) (unobstructed view of
the track). The court pointed out that any other conclusion would impose a "stop, look
and listen" burden on the train at all crossings. Id. at 767.
121. Massey v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 132 So.2d 469 (Fla. App. 1961). The
standing train doctrine may be expressed as: "The train remaining stationary on the
crossing, ipso facto, could not be the proximate cause of the injury, but the proximate
cause was the driving of the car into the freight train while it was standing on the
crossing, or. the plaintiff's own negligence." Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 14.1
Fla. 155, 158, 192 So. 621, 623 (1939).
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In Louisville 6 N.R.R. v. Adams12 2 the plaintiff was injured when the
car in which she was riding derailed as a result of a broke'n rail. The rail-
road introduced evidence as to the frequency of inspection by electronic
testing devices and expert testimony as to the frequency of inspection on
other railroads. In holding the railroad liable for the highest degree of care
for the safety of its passengers, the federal court applied Florida law that
"evidence of custom is not conclusive proof of diligence." 123  In another
action the court approved a summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the
issue of liability when passengers were injured in a derailment accident. 124
In the Bowe v. Butler125 case, the plaintiff was injured when a string
of boxcars was "kicked" against the box car in which he was working. The
court concluded that when flying switch activities are conducted in a
switching yard, it places a duty on the railroad to make a 'strong showing
of due care. In reversing the court pointed out that contributory negligence,
under the comparative negligence rule, did not bar the plaintiff from- a
verdict, but may reduce the amount of his recovery.126
In another accident occurring during switching operations, the plain-
tiff was injured as- he was walking to work at'night through the yards. 1 27
"No Trespassing" signs were posted prominently about the yards, yet the
plaintiff testified that he had taken this route for about a year without
seeing any of the signs. Although there were no witnesses to the accident,
the court reversed a summary judgmnt for the defendant. The court
pointed out that the moving party must establish the true factual picture
and thereby remove any serious doubt as to the existence of any genuine
issue of material fact to satisfy the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.'28
Plaintiff's husband was- found dead on the tracks in a Miami yard
where private citizens frequently crossed through and among the trains. It
was assumed by all parties that he had been passing under a train when the
train moved without warning. In reversing a judgment on a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, the court held that the decedent had placed himself in a
position of peril in which his discovery was nearly impossible and no ordi-
nary warning would have availed him. 1 29
In Apalachicola No. R.R. v. Tyus 30 the district court reversed the
122. 292 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1961).
123. Id. at 155.
124. Butler v. Borowsky, 120 So.2d 656 (Fla. App. 1960).
125. 133 So.2d 347 (Fla. App. 1961).
126. Id. at 354.
127. McCuteheon v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 133 So.2d 660 (Fla. App. 1961).
128. Id. at 662.129. Butler v. Barr, 114 So.2d 700 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,. 116 So.2d 775(Fla. 1959).
130. 114 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959), quashed, 130 So.2d 580(Fla. 1961).
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judgment in the trial court for the plaintiff and remanded the cause with
directions that a judgment be entered for the defendant railroad. The court
pointed out that
As to whether a proper warning was given, all of the defendant's
and most of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the whistle was
blown at least a few seconds before the accident. The witnesses
who attempted to establish that the whistle was not blown testified
merely that they 'didn't hear it blow."'3
In reversing the district court and reinstating the judgment of the trial
court, the supreme court pointed out that the statement in the opinion
must'be given the connotation that some of the witnesses testified to the
contrary and the resolution of the question was properly for the jury.13 2
The case may be a classic in demonstrating the extent to which plaintiff's
counsel can go in closing remarks to the jury in railroad cases.' 33
D. Federal Tort Claims Act
A landmark case under the Federal Tort Claims Act 84 involved the
alleged negligence of the Government in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue
the crew of a vessel.' 3 5 As the asserted tort occurred more than a marine
league from shore, the applicable remedy for the wrongful death was the
Death on the High Seas Act.' 36 The Government in its brief argued
This case is the first one in which a district court has held the
United States liable for the failure of its employees to reach a vessel
in distress in time to save her crew. Indeed, . . . this case is the
first in which any person has been held liable merely for failing to
arrive at the scene of a vessel marooned in a storm in time to rescue
her crew.'8
7
The court held the Government liable when the failure was due to the
negligence of Government operators ashore in reporting the location of the
distressed vessel and in directing vessels to the location.
III. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
Since the relationship between the parties often controls the outcome
of the case, the common law cases are collected according to the relationships
131. Id. at 36.
132. Tyus v. Apalachicola No. R.R., 130 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1961).
133. See dissenting opinion of O'Connell, J., id. at 588.
134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1958).
135. United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 933 (1961).
136. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958).
137. 280 F.2d at 321.
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involved where possible. It will be obvious that the major portion of
the litigation has centered around the duty of care owed to the plaintiff by
the defendant. Several new categories have been added because of the
large number of cases or the importance of the litigation in question.
A. Landlord and Tenant
In a case of first impression, the lessors agreed to repair the roof of the
leased premises although under no obligation to do so under the terms of
the lease. While the repairs were being made, by an independent con-
tractor hired by the lessor, rain came through the roof and damaged the
plaintiff's property stored in the building. Plaintiff sued the lessors for
failure to exercise proper control over the contractor. In reversing the lower
court's dismissal of the action, the court held that a lessor who gratuitously
undertakes to make repairs on leased premises may not absolve himself
from liability by employing an independent contractor.138 The case has
been criticized because the court has made the landlord an insurer for
everything done by the contractor within the scope of his employment. 13 9
An employee of the tenant-operator of a filling station brought an
action for personal injuries sustained when the safety flaps on a grease rack
failed. An automobile rolled off the rack and crushed the plaintiff's head.
The plaintiff recovered a judgment for 150,000 dollars against the oil
company which leased the premises to the plaintiff's employer and furnished
the grease rack under terms of an "equipment loan agreement." In affirm-
ing the judgment the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's determination that the oil company had undertaken to maintain
the grease rack in a reasonably safe condition.140 The court found that
the case involved a bailment rather than a lease of the rack, but that the
same legal principles governed. The defendant oil company invoked the
rule that a lessor is not liable for injuries to one on premises in possession
of a lessee unless the condition causing injury is a violation of law, is a
pre-existing defect in construction, is inherently dangerous, or unless the
lessor undertakes to keep the premises in repair. The plaintiff did not
challenge the rule, but rather relied upon the undertaking to keep in repair.14
1
138. Easton v. Weir, 125 So.2d 115 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, 129 So.2d
141 (Fla. 1961).
139. 15 U. MIAMI L. REv. 412 (1961).
140. Standard Oil Co. v. Foster, 280 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1960).
141. Id. at 914. For other cases see Robinson v. Foland, 124 So.2d 512 (Fla. App.
1960) (appeal dismissed where appellant failed to include record on appeal and court
held that under such circumstances reversible error could not be demonstrated); Meyer v.
Pitzele, 122 So.2d 228 (Fla. App. 1960) (Indiana law applied); Duchaine v. Grosco
Realty, Inc., 121 So.2d 679 (Fla. App. 1960). Duchaine involved the breach of the terms
of a lease in a shopping center. Although it was assumed that the acts complained of did
constitute breaches of covenants of the lease, the plaintiffs could present no evidence to
establish that they had sustained loss or damage.
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B. Common Carriers
It is a well established rule of law that once the relationship of carrier
and passenger is established, it will not ordinarily terminate until the pas-
senger has safely alighted at his destination. When a cab passenger, who
had temporarily alighted from the cab, was shot by the cab driver in an
argument over the driver's refusal to transport him to his original destina-
tion, it was held to be a question of fact as to whether the passenger-carrier
relationship had ended. 142
Greyhound Corp. v. Morgan143 involved a runaway boy who was
placed upon a bus in Georgia for return to his parents in Miami. It
appeared from the evidence that the boy had opened a bus window and
jumped from the bus. The bus driver had looked back several times in
the course of the trip to check on the boy. The court, in directing a verdict
for the carrier, held that in guarding a passenger from injury which is not
usual or incident to ordinary travel, a carrier is held only to the use of
reasonable care.
A passenger was injured on board ship when descending from the
upper bunk in a cabin. There was no evidence that the ladder was defec-
tive by design or otherwise and it did not collapse. The court reversed
a verdict for the plaintiff and held that while a carrier under law is required
to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers, this
duty does not extend to the point of making the carrier an insurer of the
safety of its passengers.144  The testimony of a partially blind passenger,
injured when he walked into a bus door, was sufficient to condemn his
conduct as the negligence which proximately caused his injury. 45 But
when a passenger's mental or physical weakness is apparent, or is brought to
the attention of the carrier, the high degree of care or caution ordinarily
imposed on carriers requires it to take notice of the passenger's disability
and provide accordingly. 46
In Blackman v. Miami Transit Co.,47 a passenger who was sitting on
a longitudinal seat fell over or was thrown forward and struck his head against
a metal bar when the bus stopped. The trial court directed a verdict for the
bus company. The Third District Court of Appeal held that testimony
that the bus was going faster than usual coupled with testimony that
it stopped suddenly or quickly was not sufficient evidence of negligence to
require the trial judge to submit the case to the jury and, in the absence
of showing the reason or circumstances of the bus stopping, the evidence
142. Henderson v. Tarver, 123 So.2d 369 (Fla. App. 1960).
143. 118 So.2d 245 (Fla. App.), appeal dismissed, 122 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1960).
144. McCormick Shipping Corp. v. Warner, 129 So.2d 448 (Fla. App. 1961).
145. Towle v. Greyhound Corp., 132 So.2d 798 (Fla. App. 1961).
146. Sumpter v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 123 So.2d 732 (Fla. App. 1960).
147. 125 So.2d 128 (Fla. App. 1960).
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did not make out a prima facie case of liability. In the case of Jacksonville
Coach Co. v. Rivers,148 the supreme court quashed a decision of the First
District Court of Appeal on virtually identical facts as in the Blackman
case, but with a contrary holding. As a result of these cases it is evident
that the passenger must make out a prima facie case of negligence before
it is incumbent upon the carrier to offer evidence pertaining to the circum-
stances surrounding the stop so as to negate negligence.
Upon a showing that goods are received by a carrier in good order and
are delivered to the consignee in bad order, a presumption arises that the
damage was caused by negligence of the carrier. 149 Liability in this instance
of shipment of lettuce in interstate commerce was controlled by federal
statutes150 under which a carrier is liable only for negligence.
C. Distribution of Electricity
The generation and distribution of electrical energy is highly dan-
gerous to life and property. Electricity, the basic commodity of a
power company, coursing invisibly through the quiet of uninsulated
high tension wires, of itself sounds no warning as to its lethal
nature. ... [T]hose who operate such a facility have the obligation
to exercise care and vigilance in proportion to the peril involved.15r
The above statement indicates the extent of the obligation placed upon
power companies and justifies the segregation of cases involving electrical
injury.
The defendant power company knew that a crane, stored upon its
premises, would be moved under high tension wires. No warning was issued,
no signs were placed at the scene, no safety man was present at the time of
the accident and the wires had not been de-energized. Decedent was
electrocuted while holding a cable attached to the crane as the crane boom
touched the high tension wires. Upon these facts it was held that a prima
facie case of negligence had been made out by plaintiff.152 The case was
remanded for trial as to issues of contributory negligence.
In another accident in which plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted
when the boom of a crane touched a power line, the cases hinged upon
whether the power company had knowledge of construction work of such
148. No. 31,655, Fla., July 13, 1962, quashing 134 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1961).
The supreme court permitted the filing of amicus curiae briefs in the Rivers case by
the attorneys representing the defendant bus company in the Blackman case, which
indicates the importance of the opinion.
149. Martin v. E. A. McCabe & Co., 113 So.2d 879 (Fla. App. 1959).
150. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20(11) -(12) (1958).
151. Aheam v. Florida Power & Light Co., 129 So.2d 457, 461 (Fla. App. 1961).
152. Ahearn v. Florida Power & Light Co., 129 So.2d 457 (Fla. App. 1961); see
same case 113 So.2d 751 (Fla. App. 1959), 118 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1960), remanded on
procedural grounds.
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a nature that use of a crane could be expected and also questions as to
notice of newly energized wires. Both the contractor' 53 and the power
company'54 were held liable, although there was evidence that the decedent
knew that the lines had been completed and energized.
In City of Mount Dora v. Voorhees'55 an employee of an independent
contractor engaged by the city to remove overhead power lines was killed
when the old lines came in contact with energized lines. Although there
was evidence of negligent control of the operation by the city superintendent
of utilities in directing the operation, the court upheld judgment for the
city upon the basis that there was not sufficient evidence to support the
contention that he assumed detailed direction of the servant of the inde-
pendent contractor. The opinion seems to apply a different standard of
duty to de-energize the lines or to give warning to a city than is applied
in the power company cases; the opinion relies heavily upon the independent
contractor relationship and ignores as a controlling factor the high duty of
care placed upon those who distribute electricity.
In another power company case the court charged the jury, "if you find
the death of the deceased ...was due solely to an accident, your verdict
should be for the defendant."' 6  While the court did not consider the
charge tantamount to a charge on an unavoidable accident, it was consid-
ered reversible error because the several definitions of the word "accident"
tend to confuse the jury and are frequently taken to mean that if the act
was not intentional the plaintiff cannot recover.
D. Doctor - Patient
The decisions in this area developed no new law although they involved
the unusual situations typical of doctor-patient relationships. One dentist
had the misfortune to be sued in two actions. In the first suit 5 7 he was
charged with wrongfully removing the plaintiff's false teeth from her mouth
for the purpose of exacting (extracting?) from the plaintiff the balance of
the fee due him, and keeping/the teeth for a period of hours. In reversing
a summary judgment for the defendant because of unresolved questions of
fact, the court observed the plaintiff might better have brought the action
under a count of trespass to the person. In a second action'58 the same
dentist was sued for negligent treatment. The court held that there was
no need for expert testimony to inform the jury that for a dentist, while
153. L. E. Myers Co. v. Barrs, 127 So.2d 895 (Fla. App. 1961).
154. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Barrs, 127 So.2d 896 (Fla. App. 1961).
155. 115 So.2d 586 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 119 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1960).
156. McCollum v. Florida Power & Light Co., 125 So.2d 754 (Fla. App. 1961).
157. Marans v. Stang, 124 So.2d 891 (Fla. App. 1960).
158. Merola v. Stang, 130 So.2d 119 (Fla. App. 1961).
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using a drill on a tooth, to slice through a patient's face to the point of the
chin was not the accepted method or procedure in grinding a tooth and
could be found to be negligence.
Brown v. Swindal,15 9 an action based upon alleged negligence in the
extraction of a patient's tooth, involved the important question as to expert
testimony being required in malpractice actions. The general rule is that,
except in rare cases, neither the court nor the jury should be permitted to
decide arbitrarily what is or is not a proper diagnosis or an acceptable
method of treatment of a human ailment. 160 Since the plaintiff offered no
expert testimony and the defendant testified that the extraction was per-
formed and the treatment was administered in the usual manner, the court
approved a directed verdict in defendant's favor. The court refused to
find this one of the rare cases justifying an exception to the rule.
Bir v. Foster"' was an action for injuries resulting from unnecessary
surgery. Plaintiff alleged negligence in an examination and diagnosis of
tumors on the uterus at a time when she was actually pregnant, as disclosed
by the subsequent operation. The court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action on the theory that the physicians could have ascertained the
identity of the malady, that surgery constituted improper treatment, and
that neither physician performed the examination or used methods of
diagnosis usually approved and practiced by other members of the medical
profession in the community possessing average skill, learning and judgment.
The court reversed a verdict for a defendant-physician because of the
charge that in an action for malpractice the professional character and
reputation of the physician was the most important matter at stake. 162
Two actions were brought against hospitals. One action, 63 brought
by a charity patient in a county hospital, was dismissed upon the basis
that the county was immune from liability. Another action 64 was brought
against a hospital for negligently failing to provide adequate supervision
for a new born baby, which allegedly strangled on mucus, causing extensive
injuries. Although the defendant introduced evidence of due care and.the
plaintiff presented no contrary evidence, the court held that a hospital
159. 121 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1960).
160. Atkins v. Humes, 110 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1959).
161. 123 So.2d 279 (Fla. App. 1960).
162. Zaretsky v. Jacobson, 126 So.2d 757 (Fla. App. 1961). For previous history
see 99 So.2d 730 (Fla. App. 1958); 114 So.2d 447 (Fla. App. 1959), quashed, 118
So.2d 787 (Fla. 1960). Florida law requires a doctor to defend on his conduct rather
than his reputation. Stauf v. Holden, 94 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1957). For, other malprac-
tice actions see Levin v. Rosenblum, 133 So.2d 577 (Fla, App. 1961) (summary judgment
affirmed); Olschefsky v. Fischer, 123 So.2d 751 (Fla. App. 1960).
163. Smith v. Duval County Welfare Bd., 118 So.2d 98 (Fla. App. 1960).
164. Sprick v. North Shore Hosp., Inc., 121 So.2d 682 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,
123 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1960).
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is bound to exercise toward a patient such reasonable care as his known
condition may require, and it remained for the jury to decide whether the
hospital had exercised proper care under the circumstances.
E. Manufacturers and Suppliers
In Walker v. National Gun Traders, Inc.,'65 action was brought for
injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff when an allegedly defective revolver,
which the defendant had sold to a third person, discharged. A spur had
been filed off the safety notch and the defect was not visible or apparent.
The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action and reversed
a summary judgment for the defendant. The decision rested squarely on
the opinion in Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait,, 6 which determined that the
duty of a distributor of an inherently dangerous commodity extends to the
reasonable foresceability of injury that might result from the use of the
commodity. The court pointed out that the distributor of an inherently
dangerous commodity such as a second hand revolver has a duty to those
members of the public who may be injured by the ordinary use of the
product. 6 T
The care commensurate with the use of a dangerous agency was held
to be applicable in a situation in which a gas company sold, installed and
repaired a gas range. 168
F. Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers
An engineer, with the help of a friend, was removing the bilge pump
from a cruiser. Before removing the pump it was decided to pump water
out of the bilge. When the pump was started an explosion occurred,
fatally injuring the friend. It was held that, although performing a minor
service for a friend, the decedent was a licensee and not an invitee. 6 9 This
action, brought in admiralty, involved two other applications of Florida
law. The court declined to adopt the "active" and "passive" negligence
theories as to licensees since Florida has declined to do so, pointing out
that it is the minority view. Had the decedent survived, the injury would
have been governed by admiralty law even though the accident occurred
on navigable waters within the state; the widow could not bring an action
other than under the Florida wrongful death statute, 170 and could not
recover under it because of the characterization of the decedent as a
165. 116 So.2d 792 (Fla. Apn. 1960).
166. 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
167. 116 So.2d at 793.
168. Russell v. Jacksonville Gas Corp., 117 So.2d 29 (Fla. App. 1960).
169. Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941 (1961). For connected case see 293 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1961).
170. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01-.02 (1961).
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licensee. The dissenting justice vigorously criticizes the court's interpreta-
tion of the Florida statute.171 Both the majority and the dissenting justices
felt obliged to quote Dean Prosser:
The result was that it was more profitable to kill the plaintiff than
to scratch him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the
bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were destitute,
without remedy. 172
Cochran v. Abercrombie,173 a case of first impression, again involved
a visitor assisting his host. This court also refused to adopt the distinction
between "active" and "passive" negligence. The court noted that incidental
motives of a social guest will not alter his status from a licensee to that
of invitee.
Plaintiff, who was assisting a friend who had rented a room in a hotel in
bringing articles into the hotel, was an invitee of the hotel and not a
licensee. 174  The invitee status of the guest in the hotel or of the guest
of the guest is not dependent upon whether the rent is fixed by the day,
by the month, or by the year, and it is not material in determining the
status of a guest of a hotel guest whether the latter is referred to as "guest"
or "tenant."'175
A stablehand at a race track, injured when a race horse bolted, was
held to be an invitee of the track, although not in the track's employ, since
his duties were connected with the track's business. 76  It was held to be
reversible error to instruct as a mattter of law that a business invitor is
under no duty to light a parking lot which is open to use by his invitees.177
It was also held that a landlord is under a duty to warn a licensee of any
dangerous condition known to him, but not as to latent defects. 78
The "attractive nuisance" doctrine was involved in three cases. In the
absence of any allegation that a swimming pool constituted a trap or latent
danger, the complaint failed to constitute a cause of action.179  In another
suit a nine-year-old child was injured when a bundle of roof trusses, delivered
by the defendant contractor to defendant builder's building site, fell and
171. 282 F.2d at 278.
172. Id. at 274, 278; PROSSER, TORTS 710 (2d ed. 1955).
173. 118 So.2d 636 (Fla. App. 1960).
174. Ortner v. Linch, 128 So.2d 152 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, 138 So.2d
340 (Fla. 1961).
175. Ibid.
176. Gulf Stream Park Racing Ass'n v. Miller, 119 So.2d 749 (Fla. App.), cert.
denied, 125 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1960).
177. Reed v. Ingham, 125 So.2d 301 (Fla. App. 1960).
178. Tomei v. Center, 116 So.2d 251 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 120 So.2d
616 (Fla. 1960).
179. Banks v. Mason, 132 So.2d 219 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 136 So.2d 348(Fla. 1961).
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broke the child's leg.' s0 The court held that Florida still adheres to the
rule of nonliability of the delivering contractor, although the more modern
view holds the contractor liable for foreseeable harm caused by his negli-
gence. The builder's liability was considered to be a jury question.
A twelve-year-old minor was injured by the action of another minor
who threw slaked lime into his eye as they were playing around a house
under construction. The court indicated an intent to direct a verdict for
the defendant contractor because the house rather than the mortar box
constituted the attractive nuisance, and the event which caused the injury
was not foreseeable. The plaintiff took a nonsuit and appealed. The dis-
trict court held that the materials and tools around a construction site could
be considered part of the attractive nuisance presented by the house itself,
and that questions of foreseeability were for the jury.' 8 ' The court also
pointed out that the doctrine may be applicable to a general contractor
who has overall charge of construction even though the instrumentality
may have been left accessible by a subcontractor.
G. Care Owed Invitees
Injuries to invitees continued to produce a large number of cases.
Although the bulk of the cases involved falls, there were a number of cases
involving other types of accidents, including several unique factual situations.
1. INJURIES NOT INVOLVING FALLS
A patron in a theater, being escorted to the lobby by the manager upon
suspicion of being a child molester, broke away from the manager and
brushed past the plaintiff knocking her against a seat and onto the floor.
A jury verdict for the plaintiff was reversed, the court holding that knowledge
that a person may be a child molester is not knowledge that he could
become violent, nor is it sufficient knowledge from which defendant's em-
ployees could have reasonably anticipated violence which would or might
result in injury to another person.' 82
The operator of a drive-in food store permitted automobiles to park
perpendicular to the front of the store and had not erected a barrier or
curb in front of the store. A motorist "drove in" injuring the plaintiff.
The court held that the store operator had breached no duty to the plaintiff
and that the accident was not foreseeable. 188
An innkeeper must inspect premises newly opened for occupancy to
180. Baader v. Looby, 126 So.2d 745 (Fla. App. 1961).
181. Fouraker v. Mullis, 120 So.2d 808 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 123 So.2d 674
(Fla. 1960).
182. Wometco Theatres Corp. v. Rath, 123 So.2d 472 (Fla. App. 1960).
183. Schatz v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 128 So.2d 901 (Fla. App. 1961).
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determine whether they meet the requirement that an innkeeper provide
business invitees with a reasonably safe place for their sojourn. Whether
reasonable inspection would have revealed a defect in a chair was held to
be a jury question. The failure of the chair to support the first occupant
of a hotel room newly opened for occupancy warranted an inference that
the chair was defective.8 4  Another plaintiff was injured when she sat on a
canvas stool to try on a pair of shoes. Again it was held to be a jury
question as to whether the plaintiff could reasonably assume that the stool
was for customers' use, whether she was an invitee in relation to the stool
and whether inspection of the stool was negligently performed.',, A
patron suing store owners for injuries received when a can of wax fell from
a shelf onto her leg had the burden of proving that the store owners created
the dangerous condition and had actual knowledge or should have known
of the condition.'8"
2. SLIP, TRIP AND FALL
Twenty cases involved the duty owed falling plaintiffs. The cases split
eleven to nine in favor of trial by jury. One opinion of the Second District
Court of Appeal includes a sharp criticism of summary judgments in cases
involving negligence and contributory negligence and is well worth reading.187
In Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell88 the court cast doubt upon the
opinion in Pogue v. Great Atl. 6' Pac. Tea Co., 89 decided by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1957. The court concluded that Florida deci-
sions were interpreted much more broadly in the direction of "storekeeper
liability" than was justified. It was further pointed out that the federal
court in Pogue laid aside and declined to follow the rule of the Florida
courts regarding inferences based on circumstantial evidence. In Trusell
a customer fell in a store, apparently as a result of slipping on a piece of
lettuce; no one knew how the lettuce happened to be on the floor, how
long it had been there or who placed it there. In quashing the decision
of the district court, the opinion pointed out that
It is apparent that a jury could not reach a conclusion imposing
liability ... without indulging in the prohibited mental gymnastics
of constructing one inference upon another inference in a situation
where, admittedly, the initial inference was not justified to the
exclusion of all other reasonable inferences. 90
184. Schneider v. K.S.B. Realty & Investing Corp., 128 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1961).
185. Harvey v. Maistrosky, 114 So.2d 810 (Fla. App. 1959).
186. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Spinelli, 122 So.2d 41 (Fla. App. 1960).
187. Perry v. Broward Drug & Surgical Supply, Inc., 131 So.2d 763 (Fla. App. 1961).
188. 131 So.2d 730 (Fla.), quashing 122 So.2d 616 (Fla. App. 1960).
189. 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).
190. 131 So.2d at 733.
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An architect's deposition that the stairs at a dog track were not con-
structed in accordance with good architectural practice and created a dan-
gerous condition was the basis for reversal of a summary judgment for the
defendant.' 9' A customer's statement that she "guessed" the tripod over
which she tripped was clearly visible did not justify a summary judgment
in another action. 192
H. Master - Servant
The degree to which workmen's compensation has superseded most
of the common law master-servant litigation is well illustrated in Grice v.
Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co., 193 in which an employee lost a testicle in
the course of employment when a block of wood flew from a machine.
The employee accepted benefits under the act 94 and brought an action
at law against the employer alleging negligence. The court held that by
accepting benefits of the act the employee relinquished his common law
right to compensation for those elements of damages that normally flow
from the injury but, having no relationship to earning capacity, are not
compensable under the act. The fact that in a particular case the injury
suffered does not in fact result in a loss or diminution of earning capacity
is immaterial.
During the course of a robbery attempt in a service station the plaintiff,
employed as an attendant, was assaulted, shot and wounded. Held, danger
of injury to an employee from an unlawful or criminal act of a stranger
is not a danger from which the employer ordinarily would incur liability
in the discharge of his duty to furnish a safe place to work for his em-
ployees; nor is the employer ordinarily under a legal duty to protect his
employees from unlawful assaults by strangers. 195
191. Majeske v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 117 So.2d 531 (Fla. App. 1959), cert.
denied, 122 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1960).
192. Purdon v. Cohen, 126 So.2d 575 (Fla. App. 1961). For other slip, trip and
fall cases see Holmes v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 133 So.2d 651 (Fla. App. 1961);
Hanson v. Shell's City, Inc., 133 So.2d 573 (Fla. App. 1961); Tawell v. Sternwheeler
Co., 133 So.2d 461 (Fla. App. 1961); Jung Gwong v. Tampa Hotels, Inc., 132
So.2d 232 (Fla. App. 1961); Perry v. Broward Drug & Surgical Supply, Inc., 131 So.2d
763 (Fla. App. 1961); City of Pompano Beach v. Edwards, 129 So.2d 144 (Fla. App.
1961); Caldwell v. Gulf Beach Club, Inc., 127 So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1961); Kuebler v.
Volusia jai Alai, Inc., 126 So.2d 163 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. denied, 131 So.2d 201
(Fla. 1961); Reed v. Ingham, 125 So.2d 301 (Fla. App. 1960); Shapiro v. Woolworth,
120 So.2d 806 (Fla. App. 1960); Sammons v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 118 So.2d 231
(Fla. App. 1960); Fendrick v. Faeges, 117 So.2d 858 (Fla. App. 1960); Sinopoli v.
Courshon, 116 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1959); Castillo v. Baker's Shoe Stores, Inc., 115
So.2d 427 (Fla. App. 1959); City of Tampa v. Johnson, 114 So.2d 807 (Fla. App. 1959);
North Am. Co. v. Landahl, 113 So.2d 588 (Fla. App. 1959); writ discharged, 118 So.2d
215 (Fla. 1960); Food Fair Stores v. Moroni, 113 So.2d 275 (Fla. App. 1958), cert.
denied, 115 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1959).
193. 113 So.2d 742 (Fla. App. 1959).
194. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1961).
195. Murray v. Osenton, 126 So.2d 603 (Fla, App. 1961).
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Defendant hotel made arrangements for the rental to the plaintiff of
a boat for bone fishing. In rough water the plaintiff was thrown into the
air and fell, breaking his back. The hotel's and boat operator's denial of
the existence of any agency relationship was not conclusive under Florida
law; the public may rely upon real or apparent agency relationship unless,
in the case of apparent authority, the circumstances are such as to put one
on inquiry. 19 6 In another case issues of implied and express authority of the
driver of an automobile were held to be for the jury.19 7
Plaintiff fell in semi-darkness at an area where defendant's newsboys
picked up bundles of papers, which were customarily tied with wire loops,
by reason of her foot becoming entangled in such a loop. There was evi-
dence which would support an inference that newsboys had been careless
in removing the loops in the past, and that the loop in question was the
wire of the defendant. The case concluded that the newsboys were inde-
pendent contractors; however, the complaint came under one of the excep-
tions to the rule as to nonliability of independent contractors, which arises
when the employer gains knowledge of a dangerous situation created by the
independent contractor and fails to halt the operation or correct it.198
Similarly, a duty imposed by ordinance cannot be delegated to an inde-
pendent contractor. 19 9 The contractual responsibility of a general contractor
to an owner cannot be delegated to a third person in such manner as to
relieve the general contractor for a violation of his duty.200
When construction is undertaken without a general contractor, and
independent contractors are engaged to perform portions of the work, an
employee of one contractor, if injured in the course of his work by another
independent contractor or his employee, may bring suit against the latter
independent contractor and is not required to resort to workmen's com-
pensation.201 Interference or meddling by an owner with a contractor's
employees may result in the exercise of control over employees sufficient
to impose liability on the owner. 20 2
I. Warranty
Although the court indicated that the case was not one of first impres-
196. Seaboard Properties, Inc. v. Bunchman, 278 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1960).
197. Jacobi v. Claude Nolan, Inc., 122 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1960).
198. Peairs v. Florida Publishing Co., 132 So.2d 561 (Fla. App. 1961).199. Mastrandrea v. J. Mann, Inc., 128 So.2d 146 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 133
So.2d 320 (Fla. 1961); connected case, Mastrandrea v. Mann, 128 So.2d 201 (Fla.
App. 1961).200. Mills v. Krauss, 114 So.2d 817 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 119 So.2d
293 (Fla. 1960).201. Floyd v. Flash Welding Co., 127 So.2d 129 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 133
So.2d 643 (Fla. 1961); Cromer v. Thomas, 124 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1960), writdischarged, 135 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1961).
202. City of Mount Dora v. Voorhees, 115 So.2d 586 (Fa. App. 1959), cert.denied, 119 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1960).
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sion, the opinion in Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw203 is written in
language clearly indicating the contrary. The plaintiff was injured in opening
a bottle of soda. Evidence appeared that the bottle had been damaged
under the cap before the time the bottle had last been filled. The bottling
company and the retailer were held liable on the theory of implied warranty
of fitness of the bottle for use.
In a claim for damages to a crop from the use of fertilizer, the defendant
interposed the defense of limitations imposed under the Fertilizer Inspection
Act.20 4 The court held that the remedy provided under the act is a cumu-
lative remedy, not an exclusive one; the common law remedy remains.20 5
The injured employee of a purchaser of a riding lawnmower brought an
action against the retailer for injuries received when the frame collapsed
as a result of metal fatigue occasioned by a latent defect.206 The court
held that the injured user of the commodity, which was not a foodstuff or
a dangerous instrumentality, was not in privity with the retailer, and to
recover for injuries he had to bring an action for negligence, which would
require allegations and proof of fault. The court concluded that the deci-
sion of the court of appeal was correct in reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff, but that the reasoning advanced in the opinion was wrong. In
reaching this decision the court pointed out that the riding lawnmower
involved could not be classified under any possible dangerous instrumentality
exception to the privity requirement in a suit against the retailer based upon
an implied warranty.
McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp.2 0 7 involved an action by a
three-year-old child for injuries received in playing on playground equipment
purchased by the child's father. The district court applied the rule advanced
in Carter v. Hector Supply Co.,2os just discussed, and sustained a motion
to dismiss against the retailer. The supreme court quashed the action
of the district court on the basis that common sense requires the presump-
tion that one in the position of the minor plaintiff in this cause is a
naturally intended and reasonably contemplated beneficiary of the war-
ranty of fitness for use or merchantability implied by law, and as such
be stands in the shoes of the purchaser in enforcing the warranty. It is
obvious that the close family relationship here was controlling, but the
question remains as to how close that relationship must be. An even more
203. 118 So.2d 840 (Fla. App. 1960).
204. FLA. STAT. cb. 576 (1961).
205. Platt v. Kenco Chem. Co., 132 So.2d 27 (Fla. App. 1961).
206. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961). For prior history
see 122 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1960).
207. 137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962), modifying 130 So.2d 117 (Fla. App. 1961).
208. 108 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
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important question should be answered by the court; did the school board
which purchased the lawnmowers in Carter expect its employees to ride
them, or did the school board members intend to mow the school grounds?
The father of a deceased minor brought an action against the supplier
of a housecoat which, when worn by the minor, had been consumed by
flame causing the minor's death.2 09  The court held that the Florida
wrongful death act2 1 0 provides for a right of action thereunder ex contractu,
but that the death of minors act211 does not so provide.2 1
2
J. Defenses in Common Law Cases
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The decisions involving the defense of contributory negligence continue
to present troublesome problems of interpretation and the courts incline
to holdings that the question is for the jury. Under certain circumstances
the plaintiff is held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
the question turning upon the knowledge of the plaintiff or whether the
plaintiff (usually in trip and fall cases) should have seen the defect.218
The so-called "distraction rule" was accepted in the case of Deane v.
Johnston.21 4  In Bashaw v. Dyke215 the court distinguished the Deane case
upon the basis that the plainiff there was not attempting to handle the
object in question, whereas in Bashaw the plaintiff was attempting to move
the object which caused the injury. The opinion points out that Deane
is the only case in Florida applying the rule.21 6
Visibility alone does not settle the issue of contributory negligence in
every case of slipping on a floor or encountering any stationary object.21 7
The question is always whether the plaintiff used due care for his own
safety, taking into account all the circumstances, of which the visibility
of the object is an important one, but still only one of the circumstances.
209. Latimer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960).
210. FLA. STAT. § 768.01(2) (1961).
211. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1961).
212. For other warranty cases see Posey v. Ford Motor Co., 128 So.2d 149 (Fla.
App. 1961), prior history 125 So.2d 108 (Fla. App. 1960), subsequent history 138
So.2d 777 (Fla. App. 1962), connected case 138 So.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1962); Florida
Nursery & Landscape Co. v. Nally, 127 So.2d 700 (Fla. App. 1961); Russell v. Jacksonville
Gas Corp., 117 So.2d 29 (Fla. App. 1960); Walker v. National Gun Traders, Inc., 116
So.2d 792 (Fla. App. 1960). For a recent survey of manufacturer's liability see Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J.
816 (1962).
213. Tweedale v. City of St. Petersburg, 125 So.2d 920 (Fla. App. 1961); Garring
v. King Cole Northshore Hotel, Inc., 122 So.2d 207 (Fla. App. 1960).
214. 104 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1958). The case holds that contributory negligence is ajury question when attention is diverted from a known danger by a sufficient cause.
215. 122 So.2d 507 (Fla. App. 1960), 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 424 (1961).
216. Id. at 511.
217. Purdon v. Cohen, 126 So.2d 575 (Fla. App. 1961).
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The decision in Biltmore Terrace Associates v. Kegan218 is an important
one as to the duty of care of resorts providing bathing facilities. The court
pointed out that one who stood on a wall at the beach could clearly observe
that it was located at the edge of the ocean. To require a warning to
bathers under such circumstances would be as ludicrous as requiring a sign
on the top of an office building reading "don't jump off here. '219
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, left their three-year-old child in the care
of the child's grandmother. A contractor had left an unguarded ditch in front
of the plaintiff's home. The child, allowed to play in the vicinity of the
ditch by the grandmother, fell into the ditch and drowned. A summary
judgment for the defendant was reversed. 22 0  The court concluded that
since there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, the
plaintiffs would not be barred from recovery unless a jury found: "(a)
contributory negligence; (b) attributable to the plaintiffs; and (c) prox-
imately contributing to the death of the child." 221
.2. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
An employee's assumption of risk is suspended by the employer's
promise, made in response to the employee's complaint, to repair a defective
piece of machinery. In addition, an exception to the rule of assumption of
risk is that an employee does not assume the risk of injury incident to his
employment if the action causing the injury is done under the command of
the employer. 222
A stablehand, experienced with horses and aware of the excitable nature
of young race horses, was injured when a horse bolted over the rail at a
track. The plaintiff had assumed the risk by taking a position along the
rail, knowing the danger involved; in addition the court held that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in turning his back on the race.223
3. IMMUNITY
Florida, in the landmark case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,2 2 4
rejected the rule of municipal immunity from some torts arising out of
governmental functions. Further developments in this area will continue
as the courts interpret different factual patterns and complaints based
upon them.
218. 130 So.2d 631 (Fla. App. 1961).
219. Id. at 634.
220. Smith v. City of Daytona Beach, 121 So.2d 440 (Fla. App. 1960).
221. Id. at 442.
222. Prescott v. Erwin, 133 So.2d 332 (Fla. App. 1961).
223. Gulf Stream Park Racing Ass'n v. Miller, 119 So.2d 749 (Fla. App.), cert.denied, 125 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1960). For another aspect of the case, see the text accom-
panying note 176 supra.
224. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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A city was held not liable for loss by fire based upon claims that it was
negligent in allowing firemen to improperly use water from fire truck tank
for purposes other than fire fighting, and that the firemen were not properly
trained. 225  In this case the court pointed out that the complaint did not
allege the negligence of a municipal employee, but concerned the failure
to properly provide a city service.
The Hargrove decision did not have the effect of extending the lia-
bility of state agencies beyond that expressly waived by Florida statutes. 226
County boards of public instruction are agencies of the state and as such
are clothed with the same degree of immunity from suit as is the state.227
The only relief that can be given in this area is legislative change in the
immunities now prevailing.
The Hargrove decision does not affect the liability of a municipality
in the exercise of legislative or judicial, or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
functions. 228  In the absence of a contrary governing statute, the right of
recovery for damages from fire spreading from another's premises is depend-
ent upon the existence of negligence in the fire's origin, negligence in
controlling it, or negligence through failure to furnish means for
extinguishment. 229
The immunity of a state agency from liability extends to immunity
from liability for negligence resulting in injury to a charity patient in a
hospital operated by a county; a paying patient in a county hospital is entitled
to the same redress as a patient in a private hospital.2 0 The court in this case
distinguished a county from a municipality.
Raven v. Coates,231 another attempt to enlarge the Hargrove doctrine,
was an action by a motorist against a city for personal injuries sustained in
an intersectional collision, allegedly caused by failure of the city to main-
tain a stop sign at the intersection. The court had held in Hewitt v.
Venable232 that the negligent manual operation of a traffic control signal
was within the scope of Hargrove. In refusing to extend the liability of the
225. Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village, 132 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1961).
226. Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So.2d 406 (Fla. App. 1959).
227. Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1959).
228. Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 (Fla. App. 1959),
14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 634 (1960).
229. Bush v. City of Dania, 121 So.2d 169 (Fla. App. 1960). Damages were alleged
to have been caused from fires started by sparks and embers borne by high winds from
a municipal dump fire. The court held that negligence will not be presumed and must
be proved by the party asserting it.
230. Smith v. Duval County Welfare Bd., 118 So.2d 98 (Fla. App. 1960).
231. 125 So.2d 770 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 138 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1961).
232. 109 So.2d 185 (Fla. App. 1959). For other municipal immunity cases see
Calbeck v. Town of South Pasadena, 128 So.2d 138 (Fla. App. 1961); Town of Mount
Dora v. Bryant, 128 So.2d 4 (Fla. App. 1961); City of Coral Gables v. Giblin, 127
So.2d 914 (Fla. App. 1961); Tweedale v. City of St. Petersburg, 125 So.2d 920 (Fla.
App. 1961).
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city, the court pointed out in Raven that the placing of a policeman or a
traffic control device at a particular intersection is a matter of judgment by
city officers. The court added that even if the plaintiff's theory of liability
were otherwise sound, the causal relation between the lack of a stop sign
and the damages was more than doubtful in view of the fact that a person
using a street is required to exercise his faculties to discover and avoid
all dangers.
K. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The res ipsa cases were limited to two during the period of the Survey.
A plaintiff, injured when playing cards in a card room of a hotel in which
he was a guest by a portion of the ceiling falling upon him, was entitled
to the benefit of the doctrine. 23 3  Another judgment for the plaintiff,
injured by a sign which fell from a building under repair by a general con-
tractor as he was standing on a sidewalk, was sustained by the same rule
of evidence. 234
L. Damages
Most of the tort actions dealing with the question of damages involved
the usual questions of excessive and inadequate damages. One plaintiff,
winning on the question of liability, but dissatisfied with the damages
awarded, was likened to the "general who won the battle but at such cost
he ultimately lost the war." 23 5 Another plaintiff had her damages assessed
at "None Dollars. '23 6
In a case apparently of first impression the following charge was upheld:
You are instructed that any award made to Plaintiff as damages
in this case, if any is made, is not subject to federal or state income
taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the amount
of any award made Plaintiff, if any you make.23 7
Wise v. Carter238 illustrates the principle of apportionment of damages
in a situation where the plaintiff had been injured in one accident and
233. Kadushin v. Philmac Realty Corp., 128 So.2d 400 (Fla. App. 1961).
234. W. J. Kiely & Co. v. Dickey, 124 So.2d 731 (Fla. App. 1960).
235. Heyman v. Fusco, 132 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla. App. 1961).
236. Carroll v. Hertz Corp., 132 So.2d 624, 625 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 138
So.2d 333 (Fla. 1962). See also Clark v. Russo, 133 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1961)
(excessive damages for whiplash injury); Goldstein v. Walters, 126 So.2d 759 (Fla.
App. 1961) (loss of earning capacity of housewife); Thieneman v. Cameron, 126 So.2d
170 (Fla. App. 1961) (loss to husband for medical bills); Griffin v. Standley, 123
So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1960) (excessive damages for whiplash injury); Mow v. F. P.
Sadowski Corp., 122 So.2d 46 (Fla. App. 1960); Weiss v. Goldman, 120 So.2d 812
(Fla. App. 1960) (damages not covering out-of-pocket expenses); Aylesworth v. London,
119 So.2d 816 (Fla. App. 1960); Gunn v. Filer, 117 So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1960);
Utley v. Southern Metal Prods. Co., 116 So.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1959).
237. Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So.2d 439, 442 (Fla. App. 1961), 16 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 126 (1961).
238. 119 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1960).
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subsequently injured by the defendant. The jury should apportion damages,
if they can do so, but if there can be no apportionment then the defendant
is liable for the entire damages.
A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for pain and suffering before
death has the burden of proving the period of time that the decedent was
conscious of pain. 239
A nuisance that will be abated by injunction does not provide the
basis for damages for future harm.240  Loss of use of a truck as a business
vehicle does not justify the addition of special damages for loss of use
for pleasure purposes.241
The instruction to his seventeen-year-old sister to run over the plaintiff
justified the award of punitive damages in an action by an ex-wife against
her former husband. 242  A defendant, while driving in the daytime, suf-
fered a sudden illness in which he "blacked out." His car went out of
control, leaped the curb and injured the plaintiff who was a pedestrian on
the sidewalk. The withdrawal of punitive damages from the jury's consid-
eration was upheld since the defendant's medical history was not such as to
necessarily give him a "premonition or warning of his condition." 243
The "golden rule" argument to the jury by the plaintiff's counsel is
improper and constitutes ground for reversal. 244
Justification for the entry of a remittitur should be ascertainable from
the record.245 Except in rare and special circumstances, as where an error
in calculation occurs, Florida is without precedent for the proposition that
an additur may be imposed. 24 6
IV. OTHER COMMON LAw TORTS
An unusual number of tort cases, not related to personal injury negli-
gence actions, were encountered during a survey of the cases.
Burch v. Strange247 represents a case of first impression in a trespass
action. The court found no cases discussing the liability of a person for
acts of trespass committed by an independent contractor and applied the
same general principles as in a negligence action.
239. Morrison v. C. J. Jones Lumber Co., 126 So.2d 895 (Fla. App. 1961).
240. A. & P. Food Stores, Inc. v. Kornstein, 121 So.2d 701 (Fla. App. 1960).
241. City of Alacbua v. Swilley, 118 So.2d 88 (Fla. App. 1960).
242. Sauer v. Sauer, 128 So.2d 761 (Fla. App. 1961).
243. Williams v. Frohock, 114 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla. App. 1961).
244. Bullock v. Branch, 130 So.2d 74 (Fla. App. 1961), 16 U. MIAMI L. REV.
120 (1961).
245. Price v. Jordan, 115 So.2d 444 (Fla. App. 1959).
246. Wohlfiel v. Morris, 122 So.2d 235 (Fla. App. 1960); Sarvis v. Folsom, 114
So.2d 490 (Fla. App. 1959).
247. 126 So.2d 898 (Fla. App. 1961).
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Where the trespass is done by an independent contractor, the
other party is not liable for it when it is not authorized in any way
by the contract unless such other party controls the work or author-
izes the specific act.248
A mortgagee has no such title to or possession of the mortgaged premises as
to be able to maintain an action for damages arising out of alleged tres-
passes.249  Another investment company's agent, the premises having been
sold under a contract for deed, went to the plaintiff's house after a default
in payments, entered it through a window, and took possession of the
premises. The defendant was held liable in trespass.2 0
A corporation doing work for the United States Navy had been paid
for its services; the Navy, through administrative error, paid for the work
a second time. The assertion by the defendant of title to the drafts fol-
lowing his refusal to return them upon request could amount to conver-
sion.251  The operation of a water-ski school can constitute a private
nuisance as to other riparian lake owners. 252 Commercial activities adjacent
to homes may also constitute a private nuisance provided owners show
peculiar injury and damage different in kind from that suffered by the
community at large. 253  The additional expense to a water company and
city in discharging sewage effluent into a creek rather than into landlocked
lakes surrounded by the plaintiff's property was no excuse or justification
for the discharge into the lakes and constituted a private nuisance and
continuing trespass. 254
Fraud is a subtle thing requiring full explanation of the facts and
circumstances of the alleged wrong to determine if they collectively consti-
tute fraud. Summary judgments and directed verdicts in such cases should
be rare. "[T]he law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as
old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity. . . .Whether fraud
has been committed ordinarily requires the determination of questions of
248. Id. at 900.
249. Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Zimmerman, 272 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1959); connected
case, 296 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1959).
250. Mid-State Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So.2d 455 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,
136 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1961); see 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 493 (1962) for discussion of the
case on other points of law. For other trespass cases see Hattaway v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 133 So.2d 101(Fla. App. 1961); Overstreet v. Lamb, 128 So.2d 897 (Fla.
App. 1961); Leonard v. Nat Harrison Associates, 122 So.2d 432 (Fla. App. 1960).
The Leonard opinion contains a classical discussion of the distinction between trespass
and trcspass on the case by Chief Judge Allen. For subsequent history of the Leonard
case see 126 So.2d 615 (Fla. App. 1961) and 137 So.2d 18 (Fla. App. 1961).
251. United States v. Goodman, 287 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1961).
252. Florio v. State, 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. App. 1960). The action by riparian
lake owners was brought under FLA. STAT. §§ 64.11, 823.01, .05 (1961).
253. A. & P. Food Stores, Inc. v. Kornstein, 121 So.2d 701 (Fla. App. 1960)
(supermarket operations involving noise from air conditioning units, delivery trucks in
early morning hours and odor from decayed vegetables); Hale v. Monroe Zeder, Inc.,
117 So.2d 426 (Fla. App. 1960) (floodlights, noise from loudspeakers, and noise from
unloading early in morning).
254. North Dade Water Co. v. Adken Land Co., 130 So.2d 895 (Fla. App. 1961).
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fact by the jury, if the case is one tried by jury, or by the court if the case
is tried without a jury."255
Illustrations of the diversity of tort actions are numerous. Several
actions were brought on the theory of unfair competition and the use of
trademarks, 25 6 and one case involved an injunction against the disclosure
of trade secrets by a former employee.257 Two cases involved the interference
with contract rights. 258  Another complaint alleged the violation of plain-
tiff's civil rights. 25 9  Negligent delay in issuing insurance 20 0 and negligent
loss of an employer's money were also the foundations for tort actions.26 1 The
shooting of a prowling college student resulted in an action for wrongful
death .262
Florida is one of the few states recognizing the'right of privacy, although
with limitations. A newspaper published the following statement: "Wanna
hear a sexy telephone voice? Call ...and ask for Louise.1 263  Apparently
Louise was called, for she brought an action against the newspaper. The
court concluded that employment in a business office was insufficient to
render plaintiff a public personage and discussed the standards to be applied
in determining the right to privacy. 264 The invasion of the right to privacy
may entitle one to compensatory damages and not punitive damages.
2 5
A widow brought an action against a funeral home for mental pain and
anguish allegedly caused by the funeral home's action in embalming the
body of a widow's husband without her permission. In upholding a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant the court noted that the facts in the case
did not meet the test of malice essential and that
in an action founded purely in tort in order for recovery to be
255. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Bent Equip. Co., 283 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir. 1960);
accord, Alepgo Corp. v. Pozin, 114 So.2d 645 (Fla. App. 1959), cert. denied, 117
So.2d 842 (Fla. 1960). For other fraud cases see Kaminsky v. Wye, 132 So.2d 44
(Fla. App. 1961); Rogers v. Riddle, 128 So.2d 409 (Fla. App. 1961); Prescott v. Kreher,
123 So.2d 721 (Fla. App. 1960); Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247
(Fla. App. 1960), 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 330 (1961); Nelson v. Cravero Constructors,
Inc., 117 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1960); Beck v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 117 So.2d 45 (Fla.
App. 1960).
256. Miami Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 276 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.
1960); Cameron v. Miami Ventilated Awning Mfg. Co., 122 So.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1960);
Stagg Shop of Miami, Inc. v. Moss, 120 So.2d 39 (Fla. App. 1960).
257. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So.2d 232 (Fla. App. 1960).
258. Miami Laundry Co. v. Sanitary Linen Serv. Co., 131 So.2d 519 (Fla. App.),
cert. denied, 133 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1961); Steffan v. Zernes, 124 So.2d 495 (Fla. App.
1960).
259. Ball v. Yarborough, 281 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1960).
260. Rosin v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 116 So.2d 798 (Fla. App. 1960).
261. Meyer v. L. P. Evans Motors, Inc., 132 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1961); for previous
history see 119 So.2d 301 (Fla. App. 1960).
262. Carbone v. Coblentz, 132 So.2d 629 (Fla. App. 1961).
263. Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So.2d 715, 716 (Fla. App. 1961).
264. Id. at 718.
265. Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So.2d 105 (Fla. App. 1961). The
case contains an important discussion of the liability of municipal corporations.
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effected for damages resulting from mental pain and anguish uncon-
nected with physical injury, the wrongful act must be such as to
reasonably imply malice or such that, from the entire want of care
or attention to duty or great indifference to the person, property,
or rights of others, such malice would be imputed as would justify
assessment of exemplary or punitive damages.2 1
A. Libel and Slander
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Brautigam26 involved a libel action
against a newspaper publisher by a state's attorney. The initial appeal was
transferred by the district court to the supreme court on the ground that
"inherent in the judgment appealed from there was the construction of
controlling provisions of the Florida and Federal Constitutions guaranteeing
freedom of the press." 2 8  The supreme court remanded the case to the
district court after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, and the unauthor-
ized exercise of jurisdiction would set a precedent requiring the court to
accept appeals as a matter of right in all libel trials.2 9  On remand the
district court affirmed the action of the trial court, which had rendered
a judgment for the plaintiff for 25,000 dollars compensatory damages and
75,000 dollars punitive damages. The court, in an able discussion of the
law, concluded that the press, while guaranteed the right to publish the
truth supported by good motives, has no right to publish falsehoods to the
injury of others.
The great majority of American courts hold that no comment can
be fair if it is based on misstatements of fact.... We concur in this
view and align ourselves with the majority. The appellant urges
that we reverse the trial court and adopt a rule by which corrupt
or dishonorable motives may be imputed to others where such im-
putations are warranted by the facts. Such a construction of the
defense of fair comment has been accepted in England and a minor-
ity of American courts. . . .It is our opinion that the better view
supports the holding that the defense does not embrace the right
to falsely impute one's motives, want of loyalty or misconduct in
office.27 0
A court will take judicial notice of the fact that headlines appearing
in the newspapers are written by a member of the staff of the newspaper
and they are generally not a part of the dispatches from the recognized news
agencies.27 ' Vhen the headline, written by a newspaper editor for a news
266. Kimple v. Riedel, 133 So.2d 437, 439 (Fla. App. 1961).
267. 127 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1961), cert. denied, 135 So.2d 718 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 821 (1962).
268. 121 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1960).
269. Id. at 432.
270. 127 So.2d at 723. Carroll, J., dissented in a well reasoned opinion on the
admission of evidence and the giving of a charge concerning fair comment.
271. MacGregor v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 119 So.2d 85 (Fla. App. 1960).
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item which had been released by a news agency, extends beyond the context
of the article reproduced from the news gathering agency, adding to or
subtracting from the article so that the headline in itself could become
libelous, then the newspaper would not be protected. 272 The court concluded
that the headline in question followed the news item and that the case was
not affected by sections 770.01 and 770.02 of the Florida Statutes. 273
The oral statement that the plaintiff was a"deadbeat and not an honest
person" was held to be slanderous per se.274 A complaint setting out such
statements was sufficient to state a cause of action even without an allega-
tion as to the plaintiff's trade or business when the complaint alleged that
the plaintiff had been damaged in her personal, social, official and business
relations.271
B. Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest
The public policy aspects involved in actions for malicious prosecution
and false arrest are obvious, particularly when law enforcement officers are
involved. Citizens must be given some protection against the irresponsible
institution against them of criminal proceedings by other persons, even
law enforcement officers. On the other hand, law enforcement and the
protection of society from crime would likely be adversely affected if law
enforcement agents were subject to liability in damages for simple negli-
gence in the performance of their duties if the citizens they charge with
crime should not be convicted.
Malicious prosecution and false arrest are often involved in the same
case; during the period of the Survey eleven actions arose involving one
or both categories.
Wilson v. O'Neal276 is a case of first impression in this country. The
plaintiff brought a negligence action and sought to recover damages from
a State Beverage Department employee for careless performance of duty and
failure to make due inquiry before charging the plaintiff with a crime by
causing the issuance of an arrest warrant. The court held that there is no
legally recognized cause of action in negligence for improperly causing the
issuance of an arrest warrant. The action of malicious prosecution is the
remedy available to protect persons from unjustifiable litigation. The gist
of the action is the concurrence of
(1)' The commencement or continuance of an original civil or
272. Id. at 88.
273. FLA. STAT. §§ 770.01, .02 (1961).
274. Carter v. Sterling Fin. Co., 132 So.2d 430 (Fla. App. 1961).
275. Id. at 432.
276. 118 So.2d 101 (Fla. App.), cert. dismissed, 122 So.2d 403 (Fla.), appeal
dismissed, 123 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 850 (1961), 15 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 101 (1960).
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criminal judicial proceeding; (2) Its legal causation by the present
defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original
proceeding; (3) Its bona fide termination in favor of the present
plaintiff; (4) The absence of probable cause for such proceedings;
(5) The presence of malice therein; (6) Damage conforming to
legal standards resulting to plaintiff. If any one of these elements
is lacking, the result is fatal to the action.*77
Actions may arise against municipalities 278 or against corporations and
private citizens. 27 9 A conviction in a lower court, even though reversed
in a higher court, unless the conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury, or
other corrupt means, is a good defense to the action. 28°  Florida Statute
section 811.022281 provides exemptions from false arrest in shoplifting
cases.
2 8 2
V. LEGISLATION
Only minor action of interest to the field of tort was taken by the
legislature at the last session. Perhaps the most important measure was
the provision 283 requiring that every automobile liability policy delivered or
issued for delivery in the state with respect to vehicles registered in the
state shall contain an uninsured motorist endorsement covering bodily lia-
bility within the minimum limits prescribed by the financial responsi-
bility law. 2 4 The statute provides that any insured named in the policy
may reject the coverage.285
Natural guardians' authority to settle or compromise tort claims of
minor children was increased from one hundred dollars to five hundred
dollars. 280 Notice provisions affecting tort actions against municipal corpo-
rations are provided in another amendment. 28 7
277. Id. at 104.
278. Gordon v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So.2d 449 (Fla. App. 1961); Calbeck
v. Town of South Pasadena, 128 So.2d 138 (Fla. App. 1961); City of Coral Gables v.
Giblin, 127 So.2d 914 (Fla. App. 1961) (liability of city for arrest outside of city by
police officers): City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla. App. 1960); Middleton v.
City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 (Fla. App. 1959), 14 U. MIAMI L. REV.
634 (1960).
279. Dickey v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 286 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1960);
Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So.2d 331 (Fla. App. 1961); Kern v.
Modernage Furniture Corp., 125 So.2d 893 (Fla. App.), writ discharged, 135 So.2d
715 (Fla. 1961); Tieder v. Wood, 122 So.2d 490 (Fla. App. 1960); Williams v.
Confidential Credit Corp., 114 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1959).
280. Gordon v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So.2d 449 (Fla. App. 1961).
281. FLA. STAT. § 811.022 (1961).
282. Rothstein v. Jackson's of Coral Gables, Inc., 133 So.2d 331 (Fla. App. 1961)(the detention must be in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time).
283. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851(1) (1961).
284. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1961).
285. For an excellent discussion of the uninsured motorist coverage provisions see
14 U. FLA. L. REV. 455 (1962).
286. FLA. STAT. § 744.13(2) (1961).
287. FLA. STAT. § 95.241 (1961).
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